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Abstract:
This thesis studies the phenomenon of migrants returning to their communities of origin to run
for municipal president (mayor) in San Pablo Huixtepec and Silacayoapam, two indigenous
communities in the State of Oaxaca, Mexico. I ask why political parties seek migrants to run on
their ticket for the municipal presidency, a puzzling phenomenon given that Oaxacan local
politics is rooted in traditional indigenous governing norms which privilege in-person communal
service. I also ask why return migrants seek the role of the municipal presidency. Data is
collected through 19 in-depth, semi-structured interviews with return migrant municipal
presidents, return migrants who sought the municipal presidency but lost, other prominent
community members of the two communities, as well as Oaxacan and American migration
scholars. I find that political parties seek partnerships with return migrants to increase their odds
of electoral victory through association with ‘return migrant prestige’ - a set of positive
communal perceptions which are attributed to migrants. I also find that international migration
instills in migrants a vision of how to modernize their communities of origin, which I posit is
linked to new forms of administrative knowledge and personal administrative efficacy. This
vision, and its constitutive phenomena of knowledge and efficacy, motivate return migrants to
seek the municipal presidency.
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1. Introduction
Why do political parties perceive return migrants as viable political candidates, and
conversely, what are the logics that make return migrants seek the municipal presidency? How
do these relationships affect local governance more broadly? This thesis explores these questions
through an examination of return migrant municipal presidential candidates in two municipalities
located in Oaxaca, a state in southern Mexico. At the core of my thesis are return migrants,
individuals who, after emigrating to another country (in the case of my thesis, usually the United
States) resettle into the country from which they emigrated. Some migrants who return to their
communities of origin run for positions of local authority, including the position of municipal
president (mayor).
Despite the fact that it is relatively common for mayoral candidates in Mexico to be
return migrants, still little is known about why and how return migrants decide to compete for
office. Taking into account that many of Oaxaca’s municipalities are deeply shaped by
indigenous communal norms which privilege in-person community service and community
contributions, it is puzzling why parties seek return migrants, who often have not fulfilled those
services and contributions, as political partners. Additionally, we are only beginning to ask why
return migrants want to run for the position of municipal president. Finally, we know very little
about return migrant municipal presidential governance. There is little scholarly consensus on
how return migrant municipal presidents impact local governance in indigenous Oaxacan
communities and how the experience of migration and its concomitant values and assets affect
the relationship between return migrants and political parties. Drawing on analysis of 19 in-depth
semi-structured interviews with return migrant municipal presidents, return migrant municipal
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presidential candidates, and other experts on the two Oaxacan municipalities of San Pablo
Huixtepec and Silacayoapam, I argue that parties seek political partnerships with return migrant
mayoral candidates in an effort to increase their electoral winnability through association with a
migrant’s prestige. I also suggest that the experience of international migration allows migrants
to change their vision of what is possible in their community of origin by allowing them to notice
the difference between the levels of development of their receiving communities in the United
States and their communities of origin. I suggest this observation is linked to an increased
perception of personal efficacy in carrying out this vision. This appears to be due to returning
migrants’ increased administrative knowledge and sense of personal administrative efficacy. I
find that this vision inspires return migrants to seek the municipal presidency. By administrative
efficacy I mean the belief that they have what it takes to make the changes they want to see in the
municipality, and by administrative knowledge I mean a technical understanding and capacity to
carry out the administrative procedures that bringing about change entails. I find that this vision
and its constituting self-perceptions and knowledge motivate return migrants to seek the
municipal presidency.
My findings have strong implications for our theoretical understanding of the impact of
political decentralization and transnational citizenship. I contribute to the literature on social
remittances, suggesting that return migration is an important but overlooked vessel for the
transmission of ideas and attitudes to communities of origin. I also offer a more comprehensive
understanding of the political relationships between political parties and return migrants,
suggesting that such relationships can be constructive in accordance with a migrant’s vision.
Finally, by placing emphasis on the ideas and attitudes which return migrants bring to the
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municipal presidency, we can better understand whether return migrant municipal presidents
diminish the presence of indigenous customs and communal practices in local politics.
The organization of my thesis is as follows: I first define the concept of return migrant
mayoral candidacies and contextualize the phenomenon in contemporary Mexican politics.
Subsequently, I review how various literatures help us to understand why parties seek return
migrants to be mayoral candidates and why return migrants seek municipal presidencies. I then
outline the design of the study by stating my theoretical expectations, detailing my case
selection, and describing the use of evidence. Subsequently, I discuss why political parties view
return migrants as valuable political partners, explaining the composition and significance of
migrant prestige. I then move to discuss why return migrants seek the municipal presidency,
suggesting that international migration instills a vision of local development that is linked to
feelings of personal administrative efficacy as well as administrative knowledge. These factors
motivate migrants to seek the municipal presidency. I then conclude and offer a discussion of the
implications of the relationship between political parties and return migrants in the broader
context of contemporary decentralized Mexican politics, particularly within indigneous
communities.

2. The Political Context of Return Migration in Oaxaca: Decentralization and
Indigenous Political Systems
Return migration is becoming increasingly relevant as a subject of study due to recent
shifts in the flow of US-Mexico migration. Since 2005 more than 2.4 million have
return-migrated to Mexico from the US (Gonzalez Barrera 2015). On a more general level, the
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net flow of migration on the US’ southern border has switched such that return-migration
outpaces emigration to the US, a trend which has been attributed to the US’ slow economic
recovery from the great recession and a relatively competitive Mexican economy in the past
decade (Gonzalez Barrera 2015). Moreover, more returnees appear to be staying permanently in
Mexico, which marks a change from a previously more transitory system of migration (Masferrer
2018).

When migrants return to their communities of origin, they participate in hometown
politics in several ways, including running for municipal president. The practice of return
migrants running for municipal president of their communities of origin has a history as far back
as the 1940s, though it became more common in the wake of Mexico’s political liberalization
beginning the 1980s and 1990s, as emblematized by the passage of NAFTA under presidents
Salinas and Bush (Fitzgerald 2013, Smith and Bakker 2008). Studies have shown that return
migrant participation has persisted throughout many states in Mexico (Smith and Bakker 2008;
Félix 2018; Fox and Bada 2008). Oaxaca, the state that serves as the focus of this thesis, is no
exception to this trend, as exemplified by Danielson (2018), who finds that 15% of municipal
presidents in municipalities governed by traditional indigenous norms (Usos y Costumbres,
which is alternatively referred to in the literature as Sistema de Normas Internas) are return
migrants.
Return migrant municipal presidencies in Oaxaca must be contextualized in terms of the
decentralization of the Mexican government. Understanding decentralization highlights the
heightened political stakes of the local government with respect to the administration of public
services. Mexico’s subnational governing bodies have had weak tax enforcement capabilities
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since the country’s 1910 Revolution. For 100 years, this limitation laid the groundwork for a
steady process of centralization whereby the national government was given the exclusive right
to tax income, among other mechanisms of primacy. The Partido Revolucionario Institutional
(PRI) enjoyed a long period of national hegemony under this system, as sustained by as
subnational governments delegating their power to the PRI in exchange for the clientelistic
distribution of positions in power and patronage (Díaz Cayeros, Gonzalez, & Rojas 2002). This
system remained relatively untouched until a series of changes to national tax codes, national
education systems, and social investment programs during the 1980s and 1990s deconcentrated
the once immense amount of power that rested with the PRI.
This decentralization process was executed in an uneven, piecemeal fashion. Extant
literature on contemporary Mexican politics reveals that the effects of decentralization are highly
salient at the local level (Fox 2007). For example, Diaz Cayeros and Magaloni (2013) suggest
that a series of changes to national laws beginning in 1997 have increased the flow of national
funds to local governments. They posit that the role of local governments in reducing poverty
and the provision of public goods has increased in turn (Diaz Cayeros and Magaloni 2013). Fox
(2007) affirms this effect of decentralization by suggesting that the power of Ejidos (land grants
given to peasants by the formerly hegemonic PRI to quell unrest after the Mexican revolution)
has waned significantly since the Salinas era (1988-1994), and that mayoral politics has taken up
this slack in the provision of goods. He also posits that decentralization has led to increased party
competition at the local level (Fox 2007). Notably, although decentralization has given municipal
governments greater autonomy in deciding how to spend public funds, they still lack independent
taxing capacity.
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A key aspect of the decentralization process was a 1983 constitutional reform that
increased the allocation of funds and responsibility for the distribution of federal funds at the
state level. A consequence of this reform was that governors gained control over the public funds
to be allocated to each municipality. This change, in turn, further connected local governments
to broader subnational political dynamics (Armesto 2009). This reliance on state government
funds for the provision of public goods and services made small and rural localities (i.e. Oaxacan
municipalities) especially vulnerable given their physical isolation and lack of connection
(Armesto 2009). Beyond fund allocation, state-level administrations establish the rules and
procedures through which local political actors exercise the power of their position (Giraudy
2012). In this way, decentralization has augmented the benefits conferred on local government
actors that maintain close ties with party-dominated state politics. At the same time, this dynamic
has shaped how state governments and state-level party leaders seek to influence politics at the
state level and pursue relationships with local political actors.
Decentralization has thus heightened the stakes of local politics by increasing the extent
to which national party politics affect elections at the local level. Specifically, decentralization
has placed in the hands of national parties the control of nominations for the municipal
presidency, as well as the financing of campaigns (Langston 2017). Conversely, this dynamic has
heightened the value of winning local office by making municipal presidencies an entrance to
later electoral office in state and national politics. To illustrate this point, one study found that
from the 1980s (a decade generally understood to be essential to Mexico’s decentralization)
onward, there was a dramatic increase of candidates competing for positions in the PRI at the
national level who had served in the party’s local and state positions (Langston 2017). In short,
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the decentralization of Mexican politics has increased the relevance of local politics by
increasing the flows of funding to municipalities, fortifying the value of local-state political
relationships, and increasing the extent to which partisanship on the local level is a prerequisite
to more lofty political aspirations later on.
Beyond decentralization, strong indigenous governing tradition stands out as another
crucial aspect of the local political context into which many Mexican return migrants re-enter.
Among the states in Mexico’s southwest, the county’s most prominently indigenous region,
Oaxaca has the highest percentage of citizens who speak an indigenous language. It is thus
unsurprising that Oaxacan local politics are deeply rooted in indigenous traditions. Oaxaca is one
of three Mexican states to have passed into law a system of Usos y Costumbres (UC). Usos y
Costumbres seeks to protect indigenous norms by granting some indigenous communities the
choice to elect to use customary rulership and juridical practice, as well as basic self-governance
putatively free from the influence of national political parties (Danielson 2018). Upon its
passage into law in 1995, indigenous leaders praised the new law as having multiple benefits. In
their view, a transition towards self-governance would legitimize ancient histories and cultural
practices, act as a meaningful step towards collective indigenous authority over lands as well as a
recognition that previous efforts by the Mexican government towards these ends had fallen short
(Eisenstadt 2007).
It is important to note that this system is a local-level law ratified by individual
municipalities; therefore some municipalities in Oaxaca are governed by UC while others are
governed by the national political system.
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The most notable difference between municipalities that chose to use UC governance and
those that did not are the ways in which they select municipal presidents. In UC communities,
municipal presidents are chosen through a communal assembly whose eligibility to vote is
predicated on having completed unremunerated communal service. Rendering these services also
conditions eligibility for the position of municipal president in UC communities. In communities
that did not elect into UC governance, candidates run for municipal president on a ticket with a
political party, and eligibility to vote is not dependent on having completed communal service.
The majority of Oaxacan municipalities, whether governed by a UC system or political
parties, have a mayor and a municipal council called a Cabildo. Positions in the Cabildo are
voted on by a community assembly of eligible citizens, where this eligibility is usually based on
ethno-religious identity and the completion of unremunerated community labor called Tequio and
the completion of positions in the local council called Cargos. The legitimacy of Tequio and
Cargo create highly credible systems of social sanctioning, and are so integral to life in
indigenous Oaxacan communities that migrants who are called to complete a cargo while abroad
will often return to the communities to do so (Eisenstadt 2007).1
Despite the fact that the communities this thesis focuses on are governed by political
parties and not Usos y Costumbres, adherence to Cargos and participation in traditional
indigenous festivals nonetheless emerge in the analysis as having varying importance to the
electoral successes of mayoral candidates. For instance, this thesis focuses on San Pablo
Huixtepec, a municipality in the Valles Centrales region of Oaxaca. Though San Pablo Huixtepec
is governed by a political party regime, interviewees spoke of the burdensome nature of Cargo

1

Now, in some municipalities, migrants can offer an alternative payment or service from abroad instead of having to
return to complete in-person service.
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positions as well as the very high social cost of not completing them. In other words, Usos y
Costumbres is both the name of a formal juridico-electoral system as well as a shorthand for the
customs and traditions which dominate local Oaxacan social and political life.
Thus, Oaxacan local politics is rooted in indigenous notions of citizenship which entail
both rights as well as significant responsibilities. Considering how the responsibilities that are
integral to public perception privilege physically being in the community, it is altogether
puzzling why political parties would choose return migrants as political partners. Considering
that political parties do not stand to gain politically from unremunerated community-based labor
and similar indigenous governance norms, political parties may have an interest in dismantling
such systems. My thesis’ study of return migrant municipal presidencies and the political
partnerships they create will therefore also consider how such partnerships affect the prevalence
of indigenous norms.
In sum, return migrants run for local office in Mexico. Specifically, they compete in local
political contests that have become more salient as a result of a decentralization process that gave
local officials more control over how to spend public funds yet made them more reliant on
elected leaders (and their partisan interests) at the state level. The stakes in these local contests
have become ever greater for candidates who aspire to state or national elected positions, even as
they interact, in indigenous communities, with customary forms of governance that typically
eschew competitive electoral party politics altogether. This thesis explores how US-Mexico
migration experiences condition candidates’ interactions with these dynamics.

3. Literature Review
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There is a vast literature on how Mexican migrants impact politics in their receiving
communities in the United States, as well as how they affect politics in Mexico from their new
homes abroad. The political consequences of return migration, including how the experiences
and assets that result from migratory experience shape the local communities to which migrants
return remains largely underexplored. This thesis contributes to filling this gap by studying the
phenomenon of return migrants running for municipal president.
Only a limited body of scholarship examines return migrant candidates running for local
elected office. As a result, I draw on various other literatures to glean further insights into why
return migrants run for municipal presidencies as well as how, in doing so, they interact with
political parties and affect local government. For instance, the research on social remittances
highlights the possibility that migrants bring home new values and ideas that influence political
visions and actions at home. Yet it does not fully consider how the values and ideas that return
migrant candidates obtain through migration might impact their choice to run for office or how
they interact with political parties. I also draw on studies about how both individual and
collective financial remittances affect democratization in sending countries, particularly at the
local level. Though democratization is not the focus of this thesis, this literature helps us
understand the relationship between parties and return migrant mayoral candidates by pointing
out that parties have an interest in migrants with financial resources because they can contribute
to partisan coffers and increase the likelihood of electoral success or, conversely, because these
resources can enable them to challenge entrenched incumbent parties. I conclude this section of
the literature review by demonstrating how the literature on party-return migrant relationships
overlooks migrant prestige as an important aspect of winnability. Finally, I draw on research
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concerning the role of parties in local elections. Given that until recently, and for the most part,
candidates must run for local office on a political party’s ticket, parties are an important mediator
of return migrant municipal presidencies.
There has recently emerged a small number of scholars who study return migrant
participation in local politics. Within this literature there is scholarship which claims, as this
thesis does, that migration changes the political attitudes of those who return and run for local
office. Mercier (2016) finds that those who studied abroad in a wealthy OECD country and
returned to be the mayor of their community of origin had higher democracy scores during their
tenure than those who did not study abroad. In the Mexican context, many scholars conclude that
as a result of time spent in the United States, Mexican migrants behave more democratically
when they return to their communities of origin (Burgess 2012). Danielson (2018) posits a
nuanced finding in this regard by showing that attitudinal changes do not necessarily cause
migrant political actors to have more demcoratic attitudes or behave more democratically, and
when they do they may become nullified through incorporation by dominant political parties.
Although not explicitly, these arguments echo a broader literature on social remittances.
Social remittances, a term first posited by Peggy Levitt (1998), refers to the ideas, identities,
behaviors, and social capital which flow from receiving to sending country communities. This
literature is principally concerned with whether or not international migrants remit democratic
attitudes back home. For instance, Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow (2017) and Crow and Pérez and
Armendáriz (2010) suggest that migrants abroad transmit values that favor democracy to their
communities of origin through speaking with their friends and family back home, and
resident-citizens of Latin America who regularly speak to a member of their household who is
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living in another country are less proud of their democracy. Jiménez (2008) similarly finds that
people in high-migration communities have higher levels of political efficacy, participate in
elections more often, and have less favorable views of corruption. Cordova and Hiskey (2015)
show that Latin Americans with cross-border connections with migrants living in the United
States are more likely to participate in local politics and persuade others to vote for a party.
Meseguer et al. (2016) conclude that social remittances from the United States to Mexico
increase the perceptions of members of the community of origin towards the role of the state.
Finally, Burgess (2016) finds that when migrants are embedded in translocal social networks
with members of their origin communities, those back home are more likely to hold local
officials accountable.
As a continent with many of the world’s most prominent sending countries, it should not
be surprising that this phenomenon is especially well-documented in Latin America. The pattern
also holds outside of the region, however. Chauvet and Mercier study the transmission of norms
that migrants experience abroad to analyze the participation and democratic attitudes for those
back in Mali. They find that the amount of return migrants in any municipality increased the
levels of political participation in the 1999, 2002, and 2004 local and national elections (Chauvet
and Mercier 2012).
Taken in concert, this literature shows that attitudes towards government and politics
change when those in communities of origin remain in contact with emigrants living in other
countries and when migrants return. Given the robustness of this literature, it is surprising that so
few have explored the social remittances that return migrants who run for office bring home with
them. We know that social remittances that flow from interactions between “ordinary citizens”
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who return to communities of origin contribute to changing gender norms (Andrews 2018;
Suksomboon 2008), for example, but we do not know whether returning leaders bring these
gender norms home and if it affects their aspirations for running for office, or their relationship
with parties. Similarly, we know that the attitudes of those who receive social remittances are
more pro-market (Meseguer, Lavezzolo, Aparicio 2016), but we do not know whether returning
leaders share this distinct view, and if so, how it affects decisions to run for office or returnees’
relationships with political parties. Collectively these studies broach the question of whether, and
if so, to what extent, return migrants’ attitudes and ideas are attractive to parties. They also raise
questions about how migration affects return migrants’ notions of political efficacy and, in turn,
their choice to run for local office.
This thesis contributes to filling this gap. Studying return migrant municipal presidents is
a suitable way of doing so because when return migrants run for the municipal presidency, the
new attitudes, values, and ideas which they possibly bring home with them are manifested in
observable and important political spheres, such as partisan electoral competition, direct contact
with their origin communities, and the management of municipal funds.
Much of the literature of return migrant municipal presidencies concerns their effect on
local political practices, specifically the degree to which they influence local politics to become
more or less democratic. While some scholars show that return migrant mayors shore up local
democracy, many more suggest that political parties co-opt return migrant mayors. Politically
aspirational return migrants, rather than changing dynamics with parties, are subsumed by
political parties - incorporated into parties’ practices in a manner that reinforces authoritarianism
on the subnational level (Martínez 2013). Danielson (2018) suggests that when migrants are
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recruited by political parties to run for mayor, they can serve to entrench elites’ strength and
legitimacy. Bakker and Smith (2003) similarly find that by redefining notions of migration and
citizenship, parties co-opt return migrants into participating in infrastructure projects, which
deliver goods and improved services disproportionately to party strongholds. Accordingly, many
return migrants perceive political parties as antithetical to local democratization (Bakker and
Smith 2003). Understanding the relationship between return migrant candidates and
democratization is largely outside of the scope of this thesis; however, the preceding research
raises questions and points to possibilities about how migrants come to run with a party and why
parties target return migrants to represent their party.
Parties may seek to capitalize on financial remittances that migrants bring home either
personally or through connections to a hometown association (HTA). HTAs are social
organizations formed in migrant-receiving countries by migrants from the same community of
origin to provide mutual aid, maintain connections between migrants and their community of
origin, and sometimes to pool together funds to support public events or infrastructure projects in
the origin communities through collective remittances (Duquette-Rury 2018). In the past,
political parties have pressured HTAs to direct the flow of migrant remittance dollars in ways
that strengthen partisan interests. For example, the PRI-dominated national government
consolidated some HTAs into larger state-level federations in Oaxaca so that their funds could be
channeled towards electorally favorable public-private partnerships (Smith & Bakker 2008).
Aparicio and Meseguer (2012) find in a study of PAN (Partido Acción Nacional - National
Action Party) -dominated municipalities that funds from the 3x1 Program for Migrants - a
matching funds program by which municipal, state, and federal authorities each match migrants’
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collective remittances, dollar per dollar - are allocated based on the political interests of state and
national party leaders, and that less electorally competitive municipalities benefit most from the
program. Danielson (2018) finds similar partisan patterns of 3x1 fund distribution. Such studies
reveal a pattern wherein parties create or foster a relationship with HTAs in the United States in
order to reward their base of support with migrant remittance dollars. We can glean from the
preceding literature that parties seek to co-opt migrant remittances as a strategy to ensure
resources do not go to another party and, by extension, succeed electorally. The conditions under
which migrants resist this co-optation remain open to debate. Namely, the victory of candidates
from parties other than the currently hegemonic PRI, as well as the advent of competitive
multiparty elections, demand a more nuanced account of questions of return migrant co-optation.
Indeed, while parties have inserted their interests into the work of HTAs, there also exist
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that cultivate relationships between migrants and
parties. These grass-roots movements to create partisans out of migrants indicate that
relationships between return migrant candidates and parties are not necessarily co-optive, and
that assessing whether a candidate has been co-opted by a party or not is not straightforward. The
most predominant among such organizations in some regions of Oaxaca is the FIOB (Frente
Indígena de Organizaciones Binacionales - Oaxacan Indigenous Binational Front), an
organization which advocates for indigenous migrants in the United States and throughout
Mexico and fights for the self-determination and rights of indigenous Mexican within Oaxaca’s
sending communities. The FIOB works to build linkages between migrants and Mexico's
left-most national parties - a fact that is surprising given that most of Oaxaca's municipalities are
not governed by the party system (Andrews 2018; Fox 2007). Other scholars note that the FIOB
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enters into a quasi-competition to collect funds for their hometowns and to define the terms of
their relationship with the municipal administrations and the Oaxacan State government.
(Velasco Ortíz 2005)
Moreover, just as parties seek to co-opt the financial resources of migrants, financial
remittances can aid political actors to resist co-optation and clientelism. Research on family
remittances (those sent privately by migrants to household members remaining in the community
of origin) shows that remittance receivers are less susceptible to clientelism and party patronage
(Pfutze 2014). We also know that migrant organizations who transmit collective remittances have
a stronger ability to hold leaders accountable (Burgess 2016). Though the empirical support for
such conclusions is strong, researchers have not sufficiently examined how monetary remittances
affect return migrant candidacies. For instance, what are the implications of Pfutze’s finding that
voters who receive remittances are less susceptible to clientelism for return migrant municipal
presidential candidates who return home with wealth? How might Burgess’s finding about the
accountability benefits of collective remittances extend to return migrant candidates with ties to
organizations that transmit these remittances?2
Beyond financial remittances, the effects of migrant participation in hometown politics is
presented in a similarly binary manner as either strengthening or challenging party entrenchment.
For instance, Danielson (2018) finds in a study of 12 municipalities in Oaxaca that return
migrants can either resist co-optation by political elites, which results in increased political
competition, or that political elites incorporate migrants into the prevailing system, thereby
deepening party hegemony. Fox (2007) highlights how politically-aspirational return migrants
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One notable exception here is Danielson (2018)
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help to strengthen competition and undermine the control of authoritarianism. Félix (2018)
similarly claims that when Mexican migrants resist corruption, co-optation, coercion and control
of clientelistic Mexican party politics they can improve local accountability.
Instead of assuming that migrants, their ideas, and the individual and collective financial
remittances they bring to their communities of origin are either subsumed into partisan
clientelistic practices or are used to resist said practices, this thesis adds a slight nuance by
paying attention to the ways in which return migrants can express agency within the
migrant-party relationship, and how such a relationship can be reciprocal and constructive. For
example, I provide evidence that suggests we should further explore the dual phenomena of why
parties want to work with return migrant mayoral candidates as well as why return migrant
mayoral candidates would seek partnership with a given political party. Studying how migrants’
perceive local parties as integral to carrying out their governing agendas, and the ways in which
these perceptions are caused and conditioned by their international migration experience, allows
for a more complete and migrant-centered understanding of the effects of both social and
financial remittances as well as party-return migrant relationships in the local political context.
Another way in which this thesis adds to the literature on migrant-party relations is by
considering migrants’ pre-migration political activities and partisan affiliations. Scholars of
return migrant leaders have generally neglected their pre-migration political formation. For
instance, Felix (2018) denotes the act of emigrating as the “political birth” of migrants, thus
ignoring how migrants’ pre-migration political lives and socialization altogether. In a review of
Danielson’s (2018) Emigrants Get Political, Cohen (2018) writes that the author’s “political
biography of San Miguel Tlacotepec’s Arturo Pimentel Salas focuses on his political capacity
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after having organized workers in Northern Mexico and California. Yet...passes over Pimentel
Salas’s role in the anti-PRI protests of 1968 and his training as a teacher” (p. 166). Although
scholarship on return migrants has tended to ignore pre-migration political experiences, other
migration scholars have noted their importance. Segio Wals (2013), for instance, argues that
Mexican migrants enter the US with a “political suitcase,” meaning that at the point of
emigration, migrants will have already developed significant ideological leanings and partisan
affiliations. Wals’ research suggests that pre-migration political lives are indeed influential and
that they shape the political choices and attitudes which migrants develop abroad. Using Wals’
analogy, this thesis contributes to the literature by studying if and how pre-migration political
activity and attitude formation are relevant for the relationship between political parties and
return migrants.
Finally, I draw on research that documents the challenges return migrants face when they
return to their origin countries. This section of the literature review, and indeed much of this
thesis, highlights one of the central puzzles of return migrant municipal presidencies: Given that
return migrant candidates have often lived away from their communities in the United States for
an extended period of time, it is puzzling how they become the mayoral candidate of choice for
any party. Indeed, there is significant literature that describes how return migrants are branded as
outcasts and find themselves removed from indigenous communal life. This empirical
phenomenon is observable throughout Latin America. Bibler Coutin (2016) shows that
Salvadoran youth who fled to the United States to avoid the violence of the 1980-1992 civil war
and were eventually deported back to El Salvador after a number of years in the United States,
reported feeling detached and ostracized from their communities of origin. There is also an
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abundance of literature that documents this phenomenon in the Mexican context, including in
indigenous Oaxacan communities governed by both Usos y Costumbres as well as political
parties. According to Martinez (2013), for instance, migrants who are perceived as not
sufficiently supportive of their communities of origin because they fail to fulfill their Cargo or
Tequio during their time abroad are essentially excommunicated in a process where their land is
redistributed to community members and the migrants themselves are forbidden from returning.
Andrews (2018) writes that members of a Oaxacan community which she pseudonymously calls
‘partida’ perceived return migrants to be supercilious and similarly excommunicated them.
Given the negative images that return migrants appear to carry, why do parties seek
return migrants as potential mayoral candidates? The literature posits various possibilities. As
referenced earlier, parties co-opt collective remittances from HTAs for partisan advantages
(Smith & Bakker 2008; Su 2009; Aparicio and Meseguer 2012). An extension of this logic could
be that parties seek to co-opt return migrants who return home having accumulated wealth.
Relatedly, Smith and Bakker (2012) suggest that Andrés “the Tomato King” Bermúdez, a return
migrant who became mayor of his hometown of Jerez in the state of Zacatecas in 2004, had a
reputational advantage as a result of his commercial success as a tomato grower in the United
States. Prestige was thus a salient feature of this specific return migrant’s rise to power.
However, researchers have not fully explored return migrant prestige, including its sources and
the degree to which it factors into return migrant-party relationships.
The literature also points to the fact that migrants may have already established
relationships with parties prior to emigrating as another reason why migrants and parties might
interact closely despite a long absence. Beyond the scholarship of Wals (2013), a somewhat
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limited field of scholarship suggests that ordinary Mexican citizens emigrate to the United States
already with partisan affiliations (Pachon and DeSipio 1994; Lien 1994). Yet we don’t know if
emigrants with partisan affiliations are also aspired to run for elected office before they left, or
whether and how their migration experiences catalyzed these aspirations.
Additionally, migrants cultivate or sustain relationships with Mexican political parties
during their time living in the United States through various avenues. Mexican State
governments have attempted to involve themselves in transnational migration politics over the
past 20 years for a number of reasons, chief among them being to curry favor with the
economically crucial migrant populations. Mexican governors are known to visit hometown
associations in the US, and State governments have opened casas de representacion
(representation houses) across Los Angeles, California and surrounding areas to help migrants
with bureaucratic and administrative work and to act as communal spaces (Andrews 2018;
Cruz-Pérez 2016). Parties may also seek the support of migrants abroad because they are aware
of the impact of social remittances on voting patterns in the community of origin (Paalberg
2017). Whether these state and party-driven relationships serve to groom return migrant
candidates is unknown, however.
Taking into account the preceding discussion, why do political parties seek partnerships
with return migrants? Why do return migrants seek the municipal presidency? Though answering
these questions is important for understanding local politics in the era of large-scale return
migration, they have only begun to be a topic of scholarly interest. Answering them is the main
thrust of this thesis. My goal is to add to and bring together ostensibly disparate literatures by
highlighting the possibility that return migrant leaders bring home new values and ideas that
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influence their political visions, goals, and actions. I also show that relationships between return
migrant candidates and parties may be more nuanced than current literature suggests insofar as
parties may have an interest in migrant prestige, not just migrants’ money, and because return
migrant candidate agency within the scope of competitive multi-party elections may be greater
than expected. Finally, I argue that pre-migration political socialization - migrants’ “political
suitcases” - may condition the influence of migration experiences on choices to run for office and
relationships between return migrant leaders and political parties.

4. Theoretical Expectations and Research Method
I approach these central questions with a set of theoretical expectations. I expect that
parties perceive a potential increase in ‘winnability’ by being associated with a return migrant’s
prestige, which I expect to be based on a number of factors including increased communal
participation, connections to international migrants, and that they have endured the migratory
journey in and of itself. Regarding the question of why return migrants seek the municipal
presidency, I expect that the experience of international migration, and specifically taking
inspiration from the more developed political and economic administration in the United States,
instills both a vision of modernizing their communities of origin that is rooted in administrative
knowledge as well as a sense of personal administrative efficacy that they are well-suited to carry
out the administrative changes their communities of origin need to develop. In accordance with
these two migration-inspired phenomena, I expect that return migrants seek the municipal
presidency because they perceive it to be the position through which they can implement their
administrative vision. I expect this administrative vision to vary depending on the individual
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migrant’s pre-migration socialization; and, finally, I expect that return migrants manifest this
administrative vision as municipal presidents by focusing their governance on securing funding
for municipal development, which I in turn expect to diminish unremunerated traditional
practices such as tequio and cargos.
I assessed these theoretical expectations primarily through interviews. From June 2020 to
April 2021 and spanning the municipalities of San Pablo Huixtepec and Silacayoapam, Oaxaca I
carried out 19 interviews with return migrant municipal presidents, ex-return migrant municipal
presidents, return migrants who unsuccessfully sought the municipal presidency, Oaxacan and
American scholars, and other members of the communities who have been part of the municipal
council or whose positions grant them an intimate knowledge of the politics of their
communities. Such ancillary figures included town historians, prominent judges, municipal
treasurers and other positions in the town council. Mike Danielson generously introduced
Professor Pérez-Armendáriz and me to three of his Oaxacan contacts, Martín Carreño, Rafael
Vera, and Victor Leonel. From these initial interviews, I employed a snowball sampling method
by which I allowed previous interviewees to introduce me to new ones. It was through this
organic process that San Pablo Huixtepec and Silacayoapam emerged as the two communities in
which I base my study. It bears mentioning that I include analysis of an interview with a return
migrant from Piaxtla, Puebla. Due to the fact that it is also governed by Usos y Costumbres de
facto and has similar characteristics to Silacayoapam and San Pablo Huixtepec, I found the
results gleaned from the interview to be valid and thus included them.
I used a semi-structured interviewing approach that involved preparing a list of questions
usually between two and three pages in length to use as a rough guide, while allowing the
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conversation to flow organically. Interviews were carried out virtually by video call using Zoom
or by phone calls via the popular messaging application WhatsApp, depending on the strength of
the interviewee’s internet connection. These interviews were conducted in Spanish, and usually
lasted between one to three hours. Per the approval from the Bates College Institutional Review
Board (IRB#20-21), I obtained informed consent verbally from each interviewee. After receiving
verbal permission to do so, I used either Zoom’s built-in recording function or a voice recording
software on my personal laptop to save a recording of the interview. After the interview I
uploaded the files to Amazon Transcribe using an Amazon Web Service console and downloaded
the completed transcripts to my laptop. The quality of the transcriptions was relatively poor, and
poorer still if the recording file was originally from a WhatsApp call. Therefore, in order to
assure that the quality of my data was as high as possible (i.e. that I was analyzing the exact
language of the interviewees), I manually double-checked the transcript while listening to the
audio recording. A few interviews were not recorded and transcribed. In such cases, Professor
Pérez-Armendáriz and I took detailed notes on a shared online document to which I referred
when conducting analysis.
My process of analyzing the transcripts began by listening to each recording either once
or twice (depending on the complexity of the conversation) while taking detailed notes on a
separate document to map the flow of ideas of our conversation. When there were certain
quotations or fragments of the conversation which I found to be especially pertinent, confusing,
or whose specific language was otherwise notable, I would transcribe them manually onto the
document. With detailed notes and selected fragments from all interviews compiled onto a single
document, I looked for similarities between interviews that emerged, created a list of themes
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accordingly, and color coded the document according to these themes. Below is a list of some of
the themes I employed:
-

Descriptions of modernization / westernization
Perceptions of Usos y Costumbres before and after migration
Clientelism
Civic engagement as stemming from migration
Pre-migration socialization and party affiliation
Working with resources, perceptions of personal efficacy
Influence of migrant diaspora on hometown politics

I coded the transcripts using (but not limited to) the above themes. I intended for these themes to
be broad so as to consider interviewees’ relations to them in as comprehensive a manner as
possible and not to bias my results by only including examples that corroborated my theoretical
expectations. I then compiled all passages I felt to be related to a given theme on a separate
document, where I would look for similarities and differences that emerged between different
interviewees speaking about the same themes. In this phase I paid particular attention to the
language of the quotations, noting the recurrence of certain phrases or words. For example, the
phrase la migración cambió mi visión (“migration changed my vision”) emerged verbatim or in
some closely related form in a majority of the interviews with return migrants, from which I
drew an insight that international migration experience causes migrants’ outlook to change. After
this phase I returned to the aggregate document to understand how an interviewee’s reflections
on a specific theme is situated within the broader narrative of a migrant’s life.
I assessed the connections between many interviewee’s reflections on a given theme in
order to come to my findings. When one interviewee’s reflections on a certain theme
contradicted another’s, I appealed to the recurrence of this contradiction. If there was minimal
recurrence of a certain idea, or it recurred but was contradicted by the perspectives of a
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significant number of other interviewees, I would not include the idea in my findings. Where
there was a strong recurrence of a given perspective regarding a related theme, but this
perspective was contradicted by a small number of other interviewees, I appealed to the
epistemological value of their perspective. For instance, if several return migrants claimed that
their experience abroad influenced their attitudes about local governance but a non-return
migrant in the community claimed that return migrants did not perceive governance in a
dramatically different way, I would note this difference in the findings and nonetheless conclude
that a sufficiently high percentage of interviewees agreed that it reflects a shared experience.
Zoom and phone interviews are an appropriate primary mode of research because the
information I seek is not available in newspapers or other archival documents, and because
COVID-19 travel restriction precluded the ethnographic research I had received funding to do in
collaboration with Professor Pérez-Armendáriz over two months in the summer of 2020. Despite
some limitations, the interviews, in combination with secondary sources, enabled me to develop
detailed narratives of the experiences of several return migrant candidates. This thesis’ research
centers the lives of return migrants, delving deeply into their occupations, social networks, and
political affiliations before and during their international migration experience as well as upon
returning to their communities of origin. The conversations often entail lengthy discussions of
subjects as subjective as changes in attitude over time. Such themes defy quantification and are
most richly understood through detailed stories.
In order to avoid many of the pitfalls which arise from exclusively using interviews, such
as personal and political biases, this thesis weaves secondary sources into the interview analysis
to corroborate, draw contrasts with, or otherwise make comparisons to the interviews.
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Background Information on Communities of Study
The return migrant mayors I focus on are from the two Oaxacan municipalities of San
Pablo Huixtepec and Silacayoapam. San Pablo Huixtepec is a municipality located 25 miles from
Oaxaca city in the Valles Centrales region. It has a population of approximately 17,500. With
over 60% of San Pablo’s residents living in poverty, it is statistically slightly less poor than the
average municipality in the State of Oaxaca, which is one of Mexico’s poorest. (INAFED 2010)
It has basic social services and education. The local government is composed of a municipal
president, an alcalde constitucional (a figure responsible for administering religious and cultural
festivals), secretary, treasurer, as well as 6 regidurías (councilmembers) and other agentes
municipales (municipal agents) who are responsible for provision of public goods and services.
San Pablo never elected to switch to a custom of Usos y Costumbres governance, and as such
municipal presidential elections are carried out through political parties. Beyond municipal
presidential elections, however, San Pablo is a typical indigenous Oaxacan municipality in which
citizenship entails not only rights but responsibilities. Though it is possible that it is not as
stipulated in tradition or as isolated as communities that are governed by Usos y Costumbres, its
communal life exhibits tradition and indigeneity. For instance, mayordomías (religious festivals
carried out in the name of patron saints) are some of the most important days of the year in San
Pablo. Non-municipal president positions in the cabildo (municipal council) are elected through
a communal assembly, and tequio (unremunerated communal labor) and cargos are expected
(INAFED 2010). Benito Muñoz Cruz, the cronista (town historian) of San Pablo, explained in an
interview that having completed unremunerated communal service positions is a prerequisite for
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political aspirations. In this way, Usos y Costumbres should not be exclusively understood in the
narrow sense as a legal framework; rather, we can understand that the impulse of protecting and
upholding indigenous traditions and communal life which the Usos legal codes ossify as present
in most smaller and poorer communities in Oaxaca like San Pablo.
This thesis also carries out interviews in the municipality of Silacayoapam. Silacayoapam
is both a municipality as well as the capital of a district of the same name which comprises 13
villages. It is around 200 miles to the northwest of San Pablo, located in the Mixteca region with
a population of around 6,700. It is listed in Mexican government databases as having high rates
of social marginalization, with 80% of its population living in poverty (with half of that
population living in extreme poverty) (SEDESOL 2010). Around 30% of its population speaks
an indigenous language, and indigenous customs and ceremonies are central to communal life.
Like San Pablo, festivals of patron saints (mayordomías) are among the most important days of
the year in Silacayoapam, and members of the community are expected to participate in tequio
and men are expected to run for communal governmental positions. Finally, Silacayoapam elects
their municipal presidents through political parties. While the 13 auxiliary villages that are part
of Silacayoapam district are governed by Usos y Costumbres practices, they can participate in the
party elections of the cabecera municipal. Moreover, unlike San Pablo, there is a presence of
transnational indigenous organizations in Silacayoapam, namely the FIOB.
As mentioned above, I came to focus on these two communities through the organic
process of snowball sampling. I was originally hoping to focus on one community governed by
Usos y Costumbres community and one community that is governed by national political parties
in order to carry out a comparative case study, but due to the insular nature of indigenous
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Oaxacan communities and their social networks, the inability to physically travel to other
communities due to the pandemic, and some potential interviewees lacking interest or not
responding to my initial messages or calls, the process of locating return migrants outside of the
communities of San Pablo Huixtepec and Silacayoapam proved challenging. It does bear
mentioning in nearly all ways except the process by which the mayor is elected, the indigenous
traditions and norms from which the formal juridical system of Usos y Costumbres derives its
name (literally “ways and customs”) comprise the social fabric of San Pablo and Silacayoapam.
This may be especially true for Silacayoapam, which is located in the more traditional Mixteca
region. Silacayoapam is unique in that it can be considered a hybrid of the two systems.
Therefore, we can nonetheless use San Pablo and Silacayoapam to observe how return migrants’
unique vision of governance supplants or otherwise affects the traditions which are the essence
of Usos y Costumbres.
Finally, although the majority of communities (around 75%) in Oaxaca are governed
formally by Usos y Costumbres, other Southwestern indigenous States such as Chiapas more
prominently feature communities without Usos y Costumbres governance but with very strong
indigenous traditions. Therefore, I suggest that comparing two non-Usos y Costumbres
communities allows for my findings to be relevant in a broader Mexican context.

5. Why Parties Seek To Work With Return Migrants, The Role of ‘Prestige’
My analysis shows that migrant prestige does encourage political parties to seek return
migrants as municipal presidential candidates, and that migrant prestige reflects several key
qualities of return migrants’ wealth and attitudes that could affect a party’s chance of winning. I
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have identified three main qualities: 1. a generalized increase in the reputation of migrants
among members of a migrant's community of origin on the basis of having migrated in and of
itself; 2. the use of migrant wealth to contribute publicly to religious and customary life,
infrastructure development, and patronage politics, which in turn gives migrants a public
perception as someone who is honorable and can ‘get things done,’ and 3. an understanding by
local political parties that return migrants are integral members of transborder social networks
that are highly influential in the political attitudes of migrant communities in the United States,
which will in turn influence the political behavior of nonmigrants. I analyse these themes as they
are embedded in the interviews to understand the composition of migrant prestige. In
disaggregating the concept of migrant prestige and understanding its components individually,
the analysis presents a more nuanced understanding of the various reasons for which political
parties seek to work with returning migrant political candidates.

Prestige as emerging from the migratory experience
One aspect of migrant prestige is a reputational increase which migrants gain on the basis
of having found success in the United States. One of the first interviewees to suggest that return
migrants leaders shared a migration-driven increase in their personal reputation was Martin
Carreño, a public servant from San Pablo Huixtepec who has served as the municipal secretary
of agriculture and rural development since 2011. He suggested at various points throughout our
two interviews that ex-migrants who found success while in the US are generally perceived as
successful individuals in their community. He suggests that this perception has implications for
their ability to run for the municipal presidency, claiming “And [successful migratory

31

experience] leads you to have that experience of what you can do to obtain better profits, what
you learned over there [in the United States] Well, they’re successful. You apply that here and
you can run for the municipal presidency.”
The idea that successful migration experience while in the United States gives a status
which facilitates access to the municipal presidency is echoed in the academic literature. As
referenced in the literature review, Smith and Bakker (2003) suggest that Andrés Bermúdez, a
return migrant who became the municipal president of Jeréz, Zacatecas, became known for his
success as the owner of a tomato growing operation in Winters, California. They report that
much of the rhetoric of his campaign was rooted in allusions to his business acumen, and that if
elected to the municipal presidency he would apply the same leadership and ability to get things
done to the administration of his community.
More notably, Martin also linked this perception of success to political parties’ desire to
work with migrants. For example, he claimed, “A political party sees in this person, in this
migrant, an example of life.” Later in the interview, Martin elucidated what he means by
“success” by making reference to Demetrio Velasco, a return migrant who made an unsuccessful
campaign for municipal president in 2007. While in the United States, Demetrio started La
Oaxaqueña Inc., a successful import-export business in which he shipped Oaxacan artisan goods
and specialty foods to California. Martin mentioned that the community’s perception of
Demetrio improved on account of his business venture; he said Demetrio’s successful business
helped him to become known as someone who was “successful.”
Again speaking to the example of Demetrio Velasco, Martin claims, “These examples of
life, of self-improvement, have helped the political parties see in him a good candidate.” The use
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of the phrase “self-improvement” when referencing Demetrio’s business is notable. In this way,
we can understand the community’s perception of Demetrio’s success as stemming from the
acquisition of wealth through taking advantage of the economic opportunities in the United
States.
Professor Pérez-Armendériz’s and my interview with Demetrio himself corroborates this
idea. When asked about his life in San Pablo Huixtepec after living in the United States,
Demetrio reported that people in San Pablo knew of him as someone who had started a
successful business in the United States, referring to a communal perception that “he was
someone who could get things done.” This idea of someone being able to “get things done” as a
result of their actions as an international migrant is corroborated by Duquette-Rury (2016) who
suggests that communities appreciate migrants who are able to contribute to the coproduction of
goods through HTAs and think of them as effective and competent.
Benito Muñoz Cruz, the cronista (town historian) of San Pablo Huixtepec, corroborates
these claims. Namely, he referred to Demetrio as the migrant who returned after starting a
successful business in the United States. Benito claimed that Demetrio’s business was the reason
for which “he became the most evident migrant” out of those who also returned in the late 1990s.
The notion of Demetrio’s status increasing on account of his business emerges in three separate
interviews, from which I conclude that Demetrio was a beneficiary of migrant prestige. This
aspect of Demetrio’s prestige was notably not predicated on his wealth in and of itself, but rather
the interviews suggest that it was from his ability to run a business. The fact that Demetrio
sustained his business even from inside Oaxaca appears to add to this. His business success did
not end when he re-entered Mexico. Instead, he continued to build upon the success he achieved
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by establishing a store that sold Oaxacan products in Seaside, California and by widening his
business model to not only export Oaxacan goods, but also to import American products. It is
easy to see why a political party would want to link its fate to this type of individual, if they were
to show an interest in electoral politics.
While in the case of Demetrio Velasco the importance of prestige is hard to disentangle
from the question of wealth, the interviews suggest that return migrants enjoy an elevated status
simply on the basis of having migrated in and of itself. For example, Nallely Itzel Crúz-Pérez, a
scholar of Oaxacan migration and Professor at El Colegio de la Frontera Norte, explained that
the status of being a migrant helps to make up for the fact that migrant mayoral candidates had
not participated in the cultural events of their communities of origin. This is significant in UC
communities where the path to the municipal presidency often requires this participation.
Cruz-Pérez also posited this as one of the central reasons for which parties seek partnerships with
return migrants. In her words, “Parties approach migrants in their home communities not because
they have money, but because they have influence.” Ramiro Marquez López, the municipal
president of Silacayoapam from 2007-2009, shared an almost identical conception of migrant
prestige. He complained that the PRI’s relationship to return migrants was shallow and
transactional. He insisted that they are not actually interested in the welfare of the migrant
population, but instead used migrants in local elections because they “want to be associated with
the prestige and power that migrants hold when they return to the community.”
Another notable source of the prestige which migrants enjoy comes from the
understanding that they suffered on behalf of the community. This idea emerged in my interview
with Bernardo Ramirez, a Oaxacan State coordinator for the FIOB. He claimed that migrants
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earn moral authority from the hard work they do while in the United States, and that by returning
to their communities of origin “[migrants] have not forgotten about their pueblo.” He continued
to explain that when migrants return, the community perceives their work abroad as a sacrifice
made on behalf of the community and that return migrants have strong morals. He suggests that
this is especially true in cases when migrants contributed financial remittances while abroad.
Bernardo suggested that “for migrants who have worked hard for their communities, when these
people return to complete their service to the community, the community chooses them as their
leader.” In traditional communities, service and communal contribution are paramount to
notions of honor and citizenship. We can therefore conclude that the sacrifices which migrants
make are an important source of honor.
What Bernardo explained reflects an inversion of the common sentiments expressed in
Andrew’s 2018 book Undocumented Politics. As referenced earlier, the municipality which she
refers to as ‘partida’ rejects migrants completely, and she describes members of the community
complaining that when migrants leave for the United States, they perceive themselves to be
above the community, choosing to view their community of origin as “backwards” (Andrews
2018). In light of this, Bernardo seems to suggest that by returning to a migrant’s community in
earnest after having worked hard in the US, their community perceives them with additional
respect and appreciation.
The narrative that migrants have suffered on behalf of their communities emerged in
other interviews as well. In an interview, Rafael Vera, the municipal treasurer of Calihualá and
currently a candidate for municipal president of Silacayoapam with the Partido Trabajador
(Labor Party), spoke about how perceived sacrifice was important for Ramiro Marquez’s
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successful 2007 campaign for mayor of Silacayoapam. He said “And he was well seen [by his
community], it was seen that he could perform, because he lived and suffered in the caves in the
United States.” This passage of the interview suggests that having suffered on behalf of the
community bestows a public perception that one can endure hardship and therefore can serve the
community well. Juan Abdón Mata Ramos, the Alcalde Constitutional (an honorific position
akin to a judge that deals less with politics and more with the cultural and ceremonial aspects of
the community) of San Pablo Huixtepec from 2017-2019, similarly claimed in an interview that
“When you’ve migrated, the community knows you, the people know you… for the suffering
and hard work you do over there [in the United States] for the community.” As with the previous
passage, Juan highlights that communities recognize and appreciate that migrants have worked
hard for and suffered on behalf of their communities, and that this constitutes an increase in
public standing.
Francisco Villa, a primary school teacher who emigrated to Seaside and Watsonville,
California in the 1980s and then unsuccessfully ran for municipal president of San Pablo
Huixtepec in the 2010s, also referred to the reputational gains that return migrants enjoy.
Francisco claims that people from San Pablo have a successful image of him in their minds
because he was a migrant worker in the US and then came back with significant wealth and a
desire to participate in the affairs of his community. He specifically mentions that people
perceive him as successful because he had saved a lot of money while in the US, so when he
moved back to San Pablo he was able to buy himself a nice house. During our interview he joked
that “[he] was the first to build a nice house in all of San Pablo Huixtepec.” He claimed that
because he was able to make this money as a migrant, people in the community perceived him
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well. From this excerpt we can glean that the source of his status was both due to the wealth he
accumulated while abroad as well as a willingness to bring his wealth back to the community. In
this way, we can see the above passage as in direct conversation with Andrews’ 2018 work,
which posits that migrants lose status in the community if they never intend to return or
contribute to their communities upon leaving.
Though not explicitly referred to as such, the narrative of suffering as giving prestige to
return migrants is also echoed in the academic literature. Namely, Smith (2003) shows that in an
attempt to co-opt migrants into financing State development projects, the PAN glorified the
figure of the migrant by suggesting that their hard work abroad constitutes them as an
extraterritorial insider citizen rather than an outsider who has forgotten about their hometown.
Here, as in the interview analysis presented, migrant labor is constituted as having a connection
to the wellbeing of the community of origin and leads to an elevated status for the migrant
despite the fact that the work is completed while abroad. This thesis’ findings add to the extant
literature on the narrative of migrant suffering while abroad by suggesting that in addition to
being a coercive tool used by parties, the suffering narrative emanates organically from the
community.
Thus, the preceding series of interview excerpts have put forth numerous types of migrant
prestige and have demonstrated that it is a significant reason why parties perceive migrants as
valuable political partners. Benito, Demetrio, and Martin all independently corroborated the idea
that being perceived as a “successful” migrant bestows prestige. Crúz-Pérez and Ramiro suggest
that migrants enjoy an elevated status by virtue of having migrated to the United States in and of
itself. A third type of migrant prestige can be understood as existing through a narrative of

37

suffering. In these cases, when migrants show a willingness to return to their communities of
origin after working what are often very demanding jobs, the work migrants complete while
abroad is perceived as akin to suffering on behalf of the community.
It is worth noting that in some cases the interviews do not fully permit us to disentangle
the effects of wealth and prestige. Moreover, some interviewees felt strongly that what I am
calling prestige was in fact entirely based on migration-driven access to money. For instance,
Victor Leonel, an academic at the Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en
Antropología Social (CIESAS - Center of Investigations and Higher Studies in Social
Anthropology) in Oaxaca, said that he did not perceive the act of having migrated in and of itself
bestows prestige among the community. He instead noted that the migrant identity can bring a
heighted reputation in a community of origin, but that this comes from using their financial
resources to participate in communal festivals. While most interviews intimated that prestige and
migrants' enhanced leadership was intrinsically associated with the identity of being a return
migrant, I now turn explicitly to how migrants’ financial resources also emerged as a key reason
why migrants draw the interests of parties.

Prestige as emerging from financial assets
Throughout the interviews the idea that wealth begets prestige took numerous forms,
including personal wealth distribution through gift giving and sponsoring prestigious and costly
religious events, as well as organized wealth distribution through participation in a hometown
association.
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The idea that spending personal wealth begets an increase in status emerged as a salient
theme in Professor Pérez-Armendáriz’s and my interview with Demetrio Velasco. Demetrio
returned to San Pablo having earned significant wealth as a result of his previously mentioned
import-export business in the United States. In the interview he recounted numerous examples of
using his wealth for personal distribution and communal contributions. Regarding individual
donations, Demetrio told us that with the monetary support of his friends one mother’s day he
gifted home supplies to between 2,200 and 2,500 mothers, and that he would often help out
members of his community when they would approach him for favors and monetary loans.
Demetrio additionally contributed his wealth through more communal donations, for instance
telling of his regular donations to school committees and schoolhouse constructions and his
donation of a truck to help transport children with disabilities to school. With these acts of
generosity in mind, let us consider the following passage, prompted by Professor
Pérez-Armendáriz asking him whether his migratory experience earned him an elevated status in
his community:

“I owe everything to migration. Without it I am sure I would not be
where I am today, because it complements my family’s good roots
and what I do for my community. What I do for my community is
due to what I’ve accomplished through migration and the fruits of
my work in the US, and they have been large.”
While still suggesting that the wealth he garnered as a migrant was largely responsible for
his successes, he frames the role of the wealth as facilitating communal contribution. In this
excerpt Demetrio thus suggests that his wealth was not the sole source of his increased
reputation; rather, he suggests that it plays a complementary role in his and his family’s
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commitment to the community. Demetrio also nuanced this idea by suggesting that his ability to
gain permanent residency in the United States allowed him to economically support his
community. “Crossing [the border] easily helps because you have more resources, and you can
do more for people. Legal residency helps you support the community [Demetrio is a legal
permanent resident of the US].”
Martin Carreño corroborated many of the above ideas, suggesting that “you can earn
more as the bottom planter in the US than as the owner of your own land in Mexico.” He said
that the money earned in such a market “can immediately turn you into a potential winner [of the
municipal presidency].” Later in the interview, Martin pivoted to specifically highlight the role
of wealth as begetting prestige by facilitating participation in local affairs and traditions, which is
crucial to electoral success in Oaxaca given its indigenous customs. He made reference to
migrants collectively paying for a large clock in the town square and the renovation of the town
church, as well as migrants paying for the repatriation of cadavers into the community. During
the famous discursos de campaña (campaign discourses), which are community meetings during
which candidates verbally campaign and cast aspersions at their political opponents, a common
theme levied against return migrant candidates is that they have been away from the community
and therefore have fled their community engagement. In communities like San Pablo Huixtepec,
where customary indigenous agreements like completing cargos are central to communal life,
such accusations can spell the end of a bid at the municipal presidency. Martin explained that
extensive contributions to the religious, cultural, and educational life of the community by way
of remittances and sponsoring mayordomías (important religious festivals), for example, allows
one to avoid such accusations and therefore bolsters their chances at attaining the municipal
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presidency. It bears mentioning that the extant scholarship has noted a similar phenomenon
(Eisenstadt 2007). Paradoxically, wealth can have the effect of enhancing migrants’ status in the
eyes of parties looking for electable candidates precisely because indigenous governance places
such a high premium on community contributions through roles such as that of sponsoring the
mayordomía.
The story of Francisco Villa’s post-migration life which he recounted during our
interview stands as another example of how using migrant wealth to participate communally is a
source of migrant prestige. He claimed in our interview that through the success of his packaging
and export business in the United States, as well as his frugality, he was able to help renovate the
schools in San Pablo. He said that his generosity with the schools helped to build a ‘cooperative
relationship,’ and described a dynamic of reciprocity wherein he was generous with his
community and in return people in the community perceived him well. He described that “you
get more out of being generous,” and explained that the community’s heightened perception of
him was one of the factors that facilitated his relationship with MORENA (Movimiento
Regeneración Nacional - National Regeneration Movement), the party with which he would run
for the presidency. Ramiro Marquez Lopez invoked similar themes while describing his journey
into partisan politics as a return migrant in Silacayoapam. When asked why the PRI approached
him and asked him to run for municipal president on their ticket, he responded by describing his
engagement with the community, namely that once he returned he used his wealth to begin to
organize basketball tournaments and karate lessons for local youth. Thus, conversations with
Demetrio, Martin, Francisco, and Ramiro collectively suggest that beyond merely being
perceived as enterprising and productive, the distribution of migrant wealth through individual
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gifts or contributions to community infrastructure or cultural events is shown to bestow prestige
on migrants, and is moreover cited as a reason why parties view return migrants as valuable
political partners in local elections.

Influence as emerging from links to communities of international migrants
Finally, return migrants also gained influence from social ties to communities of migrants
living in the United States. I subsume this under this section focused on prestige because I find
that the two ideas are only nominally different, and, moreover, that the impact is largely the same
in the context of this section of my thesis: parties see this influence and seek to associate
themselves with migrants for purposes of electoral winnability.
Even though these diasporic groups typically vote at very low rates, the secondary
literature on transnational partisanship in Latin America suggests that there is good reason for
political parties to want to be well perceived by migrant populations living in the US. As
evidenced in the Lit Review, by carrying out interviews with migrants in Mexico, El Salvador,
and the Dominican Republic, Paalberg (2017) finds that migrants influence their relatives and
social networks abroad in a manner that reinforces their partisan sympathies and further
motivates political activities that are typical of party militants. Also, Córdova and Hiskey (2015)
show that individuals with strong cross-border ties are more likely to participate in local politics,
sympathize with a local party, and persuade others to vote for a party. In other words, when
people in communities of origin are enmeshed in migrant social and informational networks in
the US, they are more civically engaged, politically participatory, and partisan. Political parties
thus stand to improve their electoral winnability by being in the good graces of migrants.
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Before positing the link between migrants and return migrants, it is important to note that
interview analysis widely corroborated the above scholarly finding. For instance, Martín Carreño
spoke at length about recent technological developments that have fostered more frequent
communication between migrants and their families. He claimed that this increase in
communication technology allows for migrant communities in the United States to be better
informed of the “acts that migrants do for their communities [of origin].” As the preceding
section of this discussion suggested, financial contributions to communal development projects
and sponsorship of cultural events permitted by migrants’ accumulated wealth constitute an
important aspect of return migrant prestige. Insofar as parties seek to be associated with these
cultural and infrastructure projects, it thus follows that associating with migrants could increase
winnability for these parties.
Francisco Villa corroborated that migrant informational networks are a crucial factor as to
why political parties see the support of migrants as such a valuable political asset. When he was
living in the United States, PRI officials and militants would show up at his local church and try
to get migrants to join the party. When I asked why the parties were so keen on having migrants
join the party even though most migrants do not vote while abroad, he said, “I think that we,
migrants, always chat with our families back home about matters related to politics.” This
quotation once again suggests that parties seek migrants as political allies because migrants are
influential in the voting patterns and political attitudes of their families in the communities of
origin. Demetrio shared similar thoughts in an interview, claiming that “they [political parties]
knew who we migrants are, and that we speak to our families about who to support.” He also
claimed that migrants have ‘a certain preeminence’ over their families, and that parties seek to
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benefit from this preeminence. Ramiro shared nearly identical comments by stating that part of
the reason migrants were influential in the political affairs of their communities of origin were
that they influenced the political views of their families and social networks.
Leonel similarly reflected upon the political consequences of the social and informational
networks found in migratory communities. He characterized the link between San Pablo
Huixtepec and Seaside, California as one of a “back and forth” style of circular migration. In
cases like these, where there is significant yearly outmigration from San Pablo, the migrants and
their hometown associations “do not lose contact with their communities.” In this sense, Leonel
corroborates a theme which has been outlined by many others, that in communities where there
is a regular flow to and from set communities in the US, there is significant information sharing
between migrants in satellite communities and their families in Oaxaca.
“When the population is in oscillation, in a constant back and forth
of coming and leaving, you don’t lose contact with the community.
And indeed, [migrants] acquire a political character. Including in
some cases like a local party. A local political impact like those
great concentrators of power, like FIOB, FOCOICA, and the others
who want to play a more fair game.”

Here Leonel invokes transnational associations like the FIOB and FOCOICA (Federación de
Organizaciones y Comunidades Oaxaqueños Indígenas de California - California Federation of
Oaxacan Indigenous Organizations and Communities), which is an organization whose work is
similar to the FIOB, but is instead aligned with the right-wing PAN. By suggesting that migrants
abroad are akin to large political organizations who “want a more fair game” (i.e. assure the
quality of local governance), Leonel suggests that the political interest and power which migrants

44

hold in their communities of origin is so robust that it takes on the character of a large
organization.
To understand the implications of Leonel’s claim, let us briefly reconsider how literature
on the FIOB characterizes the organization’s political activities. As referenced in the literature
review, organizations like the FIOB enter into a competition to distribute funds for their
hometowns, define the terms of their relationship with the municipal administrations and the
Oaxaca state government, and work with parties to promulgate municipal presidential candidates
(Velasco Ortíz 2005). Cross-referencing this information with Leonel’s quotation, we can
understand that in San Pablo Huixtepec, migrant social networks are a formidable political entity
in their communities of origin. It thus follows that political parties would attempt to work with or
win the allegiances of migrants and return migrants in order to benefit from these formidable
political forces.
I suggest that return migrants are important members of the social connections which
migrants maintain in their communities of origin. The interviews also suggest that parties
understand that return migrants maintain ties with members of their migrant social networks after
they resettle in Mexico, and accordingly that parties value return migrant candidates because
they can draw the support of migrant electorally important migrant communities abroad.
Alejandro Cruz, mayor of San Pablo Huixtepec with the PRI from 2017-2019, explained that
migrants in Seaside are in frequent communication with “ex-migrants” (return migrants) in San
Pablo, and that communication between return migrants and migrants abroad frequently includes
the quality of governance of those currently in power:
Well, there is a very strong link between the migrant community in
the United States with [sic.] our population. That is, we do not lose
the link… This link is of vital importance for the political parties,
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why? Because to be an immigrant does not mean that you leave
your community, rather, simply you are in another place. Your
citizen’s rights are in the population and for this simple fact,
through the internet, through technology, social media, through
television, you have to learn what is happening, you have to see
which [municipal presidential candidate] is the best option…
Migrants abroad know who are the migrants who are here [in San
Pablo Huixtepec], they talk to the migrants here, and they
guarantee the things that they see as necessary.”
This excerpt suggests that migrants abroad still have a vested interest in the political outcomes
of their communities of origin, and are able to scrutinize these outcomes by communicating with
their communities of origin using modern communication technologies. In this way Alejandro
corroborates previous excerpts. Importantly, however, Alejandro expands on this point by
suggesting that migrants abroad speak to return migrants as part of the political conversations
which constitute their investment in politics in their communities of origin. This highlights an
aspect of migrant political transnationalism that the literature largely ignores: that return
migrants maintain their cross-border social networks with migrants living in the US after they
return to their communities of origin and that this has political value and consequences. Among
such consequences is the fact that parties seek to link themselves to the politically influential and
invested migrant community abroad by working with return migrants.
Cruz-Pérez illustrated this more explicitly. During our interview she stated “a reason that
parties seek migrants who return is a recognition of their work and connection with those
migrants still in the American Union [sic].” This excerpt echoes the idea put forward by
Alejandro that political parties value the linkage they perceive between return migrants and their
migrant networks abroad, and that by having a return migrant as their candidate they would win
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the support of the migrants abroad. This would seem to be especially true in municipalities with
large proportions of their population having recently emigrated and living in the US.
I find additional evidence for this conclusion in my interview with Rafael Vera. Notably,
Rafael does not have international migration experience himself. However, he tapped Gregorio
Ramirez as his suplente (vice municipal president), who is currently living in the border town of
Tijuana and also has strong connections with communities to the international migrant
community in California. Rafael suggested that he chose Gregorio for two reasons. He claimed
that he primarily chose him because the community members in Silacayoapam perceived him
well due to his robust ties to Silacayoapam’s current migrant population. A second, related
reason is that he would have strong potential to campaign with emigrants living abroad. We can
conclude that the first reason implicitly evidences migrant prestige, as Rafael felt that his
candidacy would be strengthened through a perceived relation to the community of migrants
abroad. Furthermore, the second logic for picking Gregorio corroborates Paalberg’s finding that
winning the allegiance of communities of international migrants is crucial despite their low
turnout rate.

The Role of Prestige, Discussion and Conclusions
In this section I set out to understand why political parties seek return migrants as their
candidate for municipal president in a deeply traditional political context that privileges having
been physically present in the community to serve community obligations. I hypothesized that
political parties seek such partnerships due to a belief that they stand to increase their odds of
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winning the municipal presidential elections by co-opting the prestige and economic resources
migrants enjoy when they have returned to their communities of origin.
Broadly, the findings presented in this section of the discussion confirm this hypothesis.
Nearly all interviewees suggested that the prestige of migrants is an important factor in why they
ran for mayor, and the majority of interviewees either explicitly claimed or suggested that this
prestige was among the reasons why they developed relationships with the parties with which
they ran. While I found my hypothesis to be generally confirmed by my findings, the interviews
also revealed migrant prestige to be a concept much more complex and nuanced than I had
originally thought.
Migrant prestige emerged in the interviews not as a singular concept, but rather as the
various ways in which the experience of having migrated affects a community’s perception of
someone. Some interviewees suggested that migrants enjoy an increase in communal clout and
party interest by virtue of the migratory journey. Some understand these benefits as being a result
of having migrated in and of itself. Others attribute the benefits more specifically, suggesting that
migrants enjoy prestige when they are perceived by their communities of origin as having been a
“successful” migrant. In the salient case of Demetrio Velasco, the perception of success in
migration arose from creating a commercially successful business while in the United States.
Finally, the “suffering narrative” emerged from the interviews as another key subcategory of
prestige associated with the migratory journey. In this case, return migrants benefit from prestige
as communities of origin recognize the sacrifices migrants have made on behalf of their
communities made by leaving to work demanding jobs in the United States. Inherent in the logic
of this subcategory of prestige is that by returning, migrants prove they have not forgotten about
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their communities of origin. This is found to be especially true if the migrant contributed
financial remittances while in the United States. The suffering narrative is compelling because it
conceptualizes the migratory experience fundamentally as a sacrifice for the betterment of the
community of origin, despite the fact that migrants may have had other motivations for
migrating. Inasmuch as sacrifice for the betterment of the community is a fundamental
component of what makes someone honorable in the indigenous Oaxacan custom, the suffering
narrative presents a possible answer to the fundamental puzzle of how return migrants can be
valuable political partners in a political context rooted in indigenous tradition wherein having
been absent from the community for long stretches of time can logically be seen as a significant
electoral disadvantage. Such an explanation for overcoming the fundamental quandary presented
above and in the literature review in turn presents a rationale of why parties perceive return
migrants as valuable political partners. By exploring the idea that the suffering narrative is not
solely a tool used by political parties to coerce migrants into funding State development projects
and can be understood as a source of migrant prestige from within the community, this
understanding also contributes to the body of scholarship surrounding the suffering narrative.
Another salient aspect of migrant prestige was tied to migrants’ access to increased
financial resources in the more robust American job market. There emerged several
subcategories of note within the understanding that financial resources contribute to prestige. For
instance, Demetrio Velasco distributed the money earned from the import-export business both
individually, in the form of personal loans and gifts to mothers, as well as communally, in the
form of donating to communal causes like school committees and educational infrastructure. In
his perception, his wealth was not the source of the prestige in and of itself (see the “successful
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migrant” narrative above), but rather it augmented the resources he had available to bring to
communal contributions which were his task. Regardless, the wealth he gifted to San Pablo in
various forms still augmented his communal standing. Francisco and Ramiro offered similar
narratives wherein their wealth accumulated from their time abroad allowed for an increased
level of community contribution, which was cited as a cause for their perceived increase in
communal standing. Insofar as political parties perceive association with a community member
of high communal standing as increasing their odds at electoral success, increases in migrant
wealth may be understood giving an answer as to why parties seek return migrants as viable
political partners.
In centering the role of international financial remittances, Martin offered a different
perspective on how wealth can increase one’s chances of winning the municipal presidency.
Martin allows us to understand that due to the fact that collective financial remittances are
channelled towards projects for public benefit, they are considered as among the forms of
communal contribution on which San Pablo’s and other similarly indigenous and traditional
municipalities’ norms and systems of honor are based. Similarly to the preceding discussion of
the “suffering narrative,” insofar as communal contribution and responsibility are central to the
processes by which such communities elect their municipal presidents, we can understand
migrant prestige by virtue of providing international financial remittances as presenting an
answer to the fundamental puzzle of why parties would approach return migrants despite their
often lengthy time away from the community. With this section of the analysis in mind, I
conclude that economic resources are a fundamental aspect of migrant prestige due to their
ability to facilitate an increase in prestige-begetting communal participation.
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I also conclude that political parties seek return migrants to run for the position of
municipal president because return migrants are perceived by parties as links to politically
influential migrant communities in the United States. This section began by broadly confirming
the existing academic literature which posits communities of international migrants as highly
influential political actors despite their low levels of voter turnout. From my interview with
Alejandro I conclude that return migrants can be important members of the social networks that
migrants in the United States use to gather information about politics at home and accordingly
exert non-voting political influence. Cruz-Pérez corroborated this idea and suggested that parties
seek return migrants as political partners to be in the good graces of international migrants. In
this way, return migrants possess a form of indirect migrant prestige. This finding nevertheless
gives insights into the logic of why political parties perceive return migrants as increasing their
odds of winning the municipal presidency. Finally, this finding contributes to the literature on the
influence of international migrant communities on community of origin electoral politics by
positing the ways that such influence extends to migrant-party relationships in the sending
community.
Having explored these arguments, I now confirm their robustness by addressing the
possible emergence of the counterfactual: Would parties not seek anybody whose prestigious
reputation would increase their chances of electoral success? I suggest that this is partially the
case. However, I point to Danielson’s (2018) evidence that the return migrants who end up
becoming municipal presidential candidates emerge from sectors of society that would not have
otherwise been sources of local party leadership. There also arises another counterfactual to
consider: Does one have to be a migrant to have this prestige? To address this question I point to
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the analysis of my interview with Rafael Vera where he claimed that he chose a migrant,
Gregorio Ramirez, as his suplente. In the interview, Rafael suggested that he chose Gregorio
because he was not a migrant himself, so choosing Gregorio would influence those abroad to tell
their families and social networks back home to vote for their ticket. In this example it is thus
precisely Gregorio’s status as a migrant that was the cause of the influence.
This section of results thus suggests that return migrant prestige is a deeply complex
phenomenon whose detailed analysis offers a compelling answer to the fundamental question of
why political parties seek return migrants to run for the municipal presidency. Namely, political
parties seek to run with return migrants for the fundamentally transactional reason that they
perceive association with return migrant prestige as increasing their chances of electoral success.

6. Return Migrant Developmental and Administrative Vision
I now turn to uncover why return migrants seek the position of municipal president.
Focusing on the two Oaxacan municipalities of San Pablo Huixtepec in the Valles Centrales
region and Silacayoapam in the Mixteca region, I find that international migrants’ experiences
abroad change their vision of what is possible in their community of origin by allowing them to
notice the difference between the levels of development of their receiving communities in the US
and their communities of origin. I find that this observation is linked to a heightened sense of
their own potential role in realizing this vision. The reason for this appears to be the return
migrants’ increased administrative knowledge and sense of personal administrative efficacy. By
administrative knowledge, I mean an understanding of how to carry out these administrative
challenges. By administrative efficacy, I mean the perception that they have the ability to carry
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out complex and politically challenging administrative acts such as bringing resources to their
community. I find that it is this vision, and its constitutive phenomena of knowledge and
efficacy, that motivate return migrants to seek the municipal presidency.
Before I proceed to expound these arguments through interview analysis, I return to the
key aspects of municipal government administration to place administrative efficacy and
knowledge in context. As suggested in the introduction, Mexican decentralization in the 1980s
and 90s increased the importance of local government in managing public funds in Mexico. This
primarily happened through the promulgation of two laws called Ramo 28 and Ramo 33. These
laws are budgeting mechanisms designed to transfer money from the Federal and State
governments to the local government. Insofar as municipalities received the right to allocate
funds as local leaders wished, this marked an increase in the power of local authorities.
An important constraint on this new power, however, is that it is incumbent on the
municipal government to solicit these funds from the State and Federal government for them to
be granted. If local governments do not solicit the funds (and the power that arises therefrom),
they automatically stay with the state and federal governments, whose leaders use them to
advance their partisan electoral interests. It is in the interests of parties to control state and
federal level politics to control these funds as opposed to handing them over to municipal
governments unconditionally. In other words, these laws (Ramo 28 and 33) were designed to
minimize the amount of money the Federal and State governments would be obligated to transfer
to communities. Therefore, processes by which municipal governments seek funds are structured
to be confusing and opaque, and Federal and State governments do not go out of their way to
ensure the municipal leaders know which funds are available to them or how to obtain them.
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This is particularly true for leaders from parties that opposed the party of a State governor or
President.
It is important to note that in the Mexican context, it is often the case that political parties
seek to be in power not to pass a specific law or otherwise govern as effectively as possible on
behalf of constituents; rather, they seek to strengthen their own party’s power. With this context
in mind, we can consider how the opt-in structure of Ramo 28 and 33 laws implicates partisan
interest in local elections, which is the focus of my thesis. To the extent that the PRI (the
hegemonic party in Oaxaca for much of recent history) has maintained power it has not
distributed funds to the state’s municipios and has instead held onto them or allocated them
strategically for electoral advantage. In other words, entrenched parties have no interest in
redistribution. Alternatively, opposition parties need to be able to promise to potential voters that,
if elected, they would upend the status-quo in a way that benefits voters, such as through
redistributing the ramo 28 and 33 funds the PRI had been keeping to the community. Due to the
fact that the PRI hegemony made this process as opaque as possible, it takes significant
administrative knowledge and efficacy on the part of an individual in order to be able to
redistribute the funds.
The Programa Tres por Uno (3 x 1) Para Migrantes program is similar to Ramo 28 and
Ramo 33 in that it involves the transfer of funds from state and federal governments to the
municipio, but with the 3 x 1 program, the State and Federal governments match remittance
dollars sent by HTAs in the United States (Duquette-Rury 2016). Research shows that the
implementation of this program has been plagued by partisan politics as well. As explained in the
literature review, 3 x 1 funds are distributed according to political interests, especially to
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electoral strongholds of the party in power (Aparicio and Meseguer 2012; Danielson 2018).
Therefore, it takes strong administrative knowledge and administrative efficacy in order to secure
these funds for the community.
For mayors to serve the interests of their municipalities following decentralization, they
therefore need strong administrative capacities. This administrative knowledge includes the
ability to work through a maze of state and local bureaucracies to secure funds from Ramo 33
and 28. Interviews suggest that many of Mexico’s mayors either lack this knowledge or fail to
exercise it for the purpose of benefiting the municipio, as opposed to the party controlling the
State government, particularly in small indigenous communities. I argue that return migrant
candidates pursue office with a vision of changes they want to see in their origin municipalities.
The migration experience imbues them with a sense of administrative efficacy, which is the
belief that they can bring about this vision through the office of municipal presidency. While
return migrant candidates also bring administrative knowledge - some of which was obtained
through migration - to their aspirations, their pursuit of a vision of change as well as their sense
of administrative efficacy further enables them to gain administrative knowledge as they pursue
the municipal presidency in Mexico. For some return migrants, the requisite knowledge entails
navigating bureaucracies to realize their visions through government funds. For others,
government funds are important but so too are the realizations of local capitalist development,
with or without the aid of state funds.
In addition to decentralization-driven municipal funding structures, Oaxaca’s local
governing culture is another important piece of context for telling the story of why return
migrants may seek the municipal presidency in San Pablo Huixtepec and Silacayoapam. Despite
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the fact that these two communities elect their leaders through political parties, they are
nonetheless governed by Usos y Costumbres de facto. Therefore, whether return migrant political
participation influences the traditional norms which constitute this de facto Usos governance is
central to a comprehensive understanding of the impact of return migrant municipal presidencies
generally. The administrative knowledge and efficacy which constitute the vision I claim
influences migrants to run for municipal president have the potential to dramatically change the
social fabric of a community, regardless of whether it is based on capitalist entrepreneurship or
on securing government funds. Given that the deeply traditional and communitarian cultural
context of the two municipalities I study is antithetical to precisely this administrative approach
to bringing about change, and in some cases to change itself, I find that in some cases, return
migrant vision has the additional effect of diminishing the traditional aspects of local indigenous
governance. To illustrate these arguments, I now turn to analyzing the interviews from San Pablo
Huixtepec to uncover how these logics are manifested in this community.
Interviews reveal that international migration causes return migrants to perceive that they
know how to properly carry out development in their communities. Martin Carreño, a public
servant from San Pablo Huixtepec who has served as the municipal secretary of agriculture and
rural development since 2011, posited a linkage between migrant vision and perceptions of local
government administration. He specifically noted that after having seen “how much better things
are in the United States,” migrants often “question the competence of the municipal president” in
power when they return to San Pablo.
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Professor Pérez-Armendáriz’s and my interview with Demetrio Velasco illustrates how
the perceptions of mismanagement and feelings of efficacy which Martin describes cause return
migrants to seek the municipal presidency. He claimed,
There are things in my town that should be done so that my
town can grow. I had a lot of ideas of how to do things differently
in my town based on my experiences and how I dedicated my time
in the United States. In the United States I learned that yes, we can
do things better to produce more, so that people have an improved
economic situation, which in reality is what moved us to run for
municipal president. Because we see that in Mexico there is a lot
of potential but unfortunately the lack of technology and lack of
anyone who can carry out proceedings; I have dealt with all that
has to do with commerce, cattle raising… and this is what made
me realize that we could do something for our town, for our
people. Over there, there is more potential, more technology, and
as a result you can produce more with the same amount of costs.
This is what, more than anything, moved us to run for the
presidency.
In this excerpt, Demetrio outlines the phenomenon of migrant vision. The language in
this excerpt shows how Demetrio’s vision as a migrant is fundamentally linked to his
administrative knowledge and, relatedly, a belief in his own administrative capabilities. Towards
the former point, he claimed that his familiarity with commerce and cattle raising from his time
in the United States gave him a strong knowledge of how he could develop San Pablo
economically. He also suggested that his time in the United States acted as a sort of model from
which he learned about proper administration and development practices, and that as a result he
“had a lot of ideas of how to do things differently in my town.” Moreover, his claim that San
Pablo suffered from a “lack of anyone who can carry out proceedings” suggests that he felt a
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sense of personal administrative efficacy, or the perception that he had the capacity to carry out
these changes.
These same themes were expanded upon later in the interview when Demetrio made
reference to his attempts to implement the Programa Tres por Uno (3 x 1) Para Migrantes
program to help those in San Pablo attain some of the modernizing which he had envisioned. He
claimed “There hasn’t been 3 x 1 implementation because they [the local government] lack this
vision to find where they can find the money. They only look for the migrants to somehow bring
money to their town.” Here Demetrio instantiates Martin’s earlier contention that due to their
changed vision, returning migrants call into doubt the quality of governance of their hometown
government. Furthermore, by suggesting that those in power do not properly bring resources to
the community and that he himself would know how to do so, we can understand Demetrio as
expressing a sense of personal administrative efficacy that is related to knowledge of
administrative procedures which motivated him to seek the municipal presidency.
A similar administrative vision arose from my interview with Alejandro Cruz, the PRI
mayor of San Pablo from 2017 to 2019. Alejandro was a teacher for fifteen years before
migrating to the US, where he lived in Seaside, California for a number of months before being
deported. He reported that due to the short duration of his stay in the US, he was unable to amass
monetary resources to bring back home. However, he claimed that his time in the United States
nonetheless had a major impact on the trajectory of his life when he returned home. He claimed
that while he was in the US, “I could see the comparison between how other places were
progressing and my pueblo was progressing,” and that migration “changed [his] vision of what
was needed in his community.” Given that he was a teacher for many years, it is not surprising
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that the manifestations of his modernizing vision for the community were especially pronounced
with regard to education. He claimed, “The experience we had by going to the United States to
be immigrants, well we realized precisely that the educational system there, well there are
sources of funding, it is much more integrated, there are strong basic services and good food.”
He added that he returned from his time in the United States “feeling confident that he would
know how to bring these changes to San Pablo Huixtepec,” and that this confidence inspired him
to run for municipal president. When speaking about his time serving as municipal president
later in the interview, Alejandro emphasized his pride in being able to bring about the economic
modernization and school improvements which were inspired by his time as a migrant, citing his
ability to create gardens and better cafeterias in all of the schools in the community. He described
how since he was unable to save money while in the United States, the funding that made these
improvements possible came through cooperation with the state government. It is worth
mentioning here that when Alejandro was in office, the PRI was not the hegemonic party. In light
of this, we can consider the feat of bringing significant funding to the school system (which
likely happened through liaising with a recalcitrant State government run by a different party) to
be a manifestation of significant administrative knowledge and efficacy. As with the case of
Demetrio, Alejandro’s experience in the United States caused him to consider new ways of
community improvement through funding and additionally caused him to consider himself apt to
carry out these improvements.
The themes of modernization and its effect on the role of the municipal president are
deepened in an interview with Antonio Villa, municipal president of Piaxtla, Puebla in the early
2000s. Piaxtla is a municipality in Puebla that is similar in size to San Pablo and is de facto

59

governed by Usos y Costumbres. Antonio lived in the United States for 16 years, during which
time he worked in a vegetable store, studied English at night with other adults, and earned his
degree in accounting. Over time he took on a managerial role at the vegetable store and said he
learned how to work with clients. When asked if his migration experience influenced the way he
governed as municipal president, he responded by saying
“Definitely. I was trained by my boss [at the vegetable store]. I was trained
to treat clients well and get them what they need. And I implemented this
here [in Piaxtla] because at the end of the day we are public servants, we
are employees, and the people are going to pay for a service, whether it be
a record, a birth certificate, and you have to treat them well. In this way
the experience served me a lot.”
We can understand this passage as Antonio speaking to how his business orientation imbued
during his time working in the vegetable store changes his perception of the role of municipal
president to center on transactions and serving individuals who have ‘paid for a service’. In this
regard, his characterization of the job of municipal president using the capitalist analogy of being
an ‘employee’ is notable. Throughout the interview he also repeatedly referred to his job as
municipal president as being like an accountant of his business. Though the municipal president
is also responsible for procuring communal traditions, these aspects are notably absent from his
description of the influence of his migratory experience on how he governed.
Later in the interview, he claimed “God told me that ‘you are going to serve your town’
and I am doing it… From here I do not want more public cargos. It is very stressful, you
sacrifice your family, there is no time to live with your family.” The communal and
unremunerated logic of cargos are contrary to the efficient, transactional, and administrative
work he did in the vegetable store which he cited as the inspiration for his vision of ideal local
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government. We can therefore understand Antonio’s desire to curtail the role of cargos as an
extension of this administratively focused vision of the municipal presidency.
Thus Alejandro, Antonio, and Demetrio all witnessed a more economically sophisticated
society as migrants in the US, imbuing in them a knowledge of administrative practices as well
as a perception that they are apt to manifest this knowledge which collectively caused them to
seek the municipal presidency.
Victor Leonel corroborated that return migrants run for the municipal presidency
primarily because they seek to improve the municipality by augmenting its administrative
capacity. During our conversation, he invoked decentralization as an important context for
understanding why he perceived an increase in the amount of return migrants who seek the
municipal presidency. He explained that prior to decentralization, municipalities did not see any
significant funding from the State and Federal governments, so the municipal presidency was
primarily responsible for intra-municipal social accords such as tequio, cargos, as well as
religious and cultural affairs. With the onset of decentralization in the 1990s, there emerged
significant sources of Federal- and State-level funding for municipal development. Due to this
change, the responsibilities of municipal president were expanded to prominently include the
administrative task of securing funds from governmental institutions. As explained in the
following quotation, these expanded administrative responsibilities catalyzed return migrants
seeking the position of municipal president.
“This is really what has detonated migrants running for municipal
president - decentralization and its greater level of control of
resources. This has inscribed the interest in the municipal
presidency of professionals, of migrants, other sections of the
population who had traditionally not participated so actively, or
had not participated through high posts in the council… Resource
management as a way into the political questions of the
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community. Because of [decentralization] migrants seek to come
back, and when they do they do so to find positions of power. Not
just political power but now also political power accompanied with
resource pools [with which] they can make change possible. ”
In this excerpt Leonel suggests that the promulgation of Ramo 28 and Ramo 33 (note that these
are the programs to which he was referring, even if he does not name them explicitly) have
increased the potential for the municipal president to control the community’s resources. By
claiming that migrants began to seek the municipal presidency at higher rates in direct response
to the greater availability of and potential to control the direction of municipal resources, we can
glean that migrants are motivated to run by a vision of municipal government that is rooted in a
knowledge of administrative processes as well as a confidence in their own ability to carry them
out.
Furthermore, Leonel suggests that the sense of administrative efficacy which motivates
migrants to seek the municipal presidency also changes how municipal presidential campaigns
are carried out and, by extension, the role of the municipal presidency within local politics more
generally. He explained that in the past, the municipal presidency is akin to a customary
stewardship of the community and that those who campaigned for the municipal presidency were
largely motivated to do so by notions of family honor and out of a sense of duty to the
community. Campaigns for the municipal president were carried out accordingly: candidates
promised to uphold communal traditions and cited their long career of completing
unremunerated posts in the municipal council as proof of their commitment to the community
and their fitness to lead.
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Alternatively, he suggested that return migrants who seek the presidency in the era of
decentralization often do so shortly after returning from the United States with far fewer years of
unremunerated municipal service than those who had not migrated. He also noted that, both in
communities who elect their leaders through political parties as well as those who elect their
leaders through a system of Usos y Costumbres, return migrants campaign more prominently on
bringing resources to the community and have caused municipal elections to become more
competitive in nature. As a result, he claimed, “You lose the centrality of the idea of service to
the post.” As the previous paragraphs have shown, return migrants seek the municipal presidency
in a way that reflects their competitive and administration-oriented attitudes instilled during their
time as an international migrant. Leonel has also demonstrated how return migrant municipal
presidencies act as catalysts of decentralization by changing the position of municipal president
towards one that is fundamentally competitive and administrative, thereby supplanting the
traditional role of the municipal president as a steward of the municipality concerned with its
internal administration and cultural affairs. Thus, one effect of decentralization and the
administrative reasons for which return migrants seek the municipal presidency is a diminishing
of the insular and communitarian nature of Oaxacan municipal politics in both Usos and
non-Usos communities.
The changes in the perception of the role of the municipal presidency which have
heretofore been illustrated by Alejandro, Antonio, and Demetrio and contextualized by Leonel
also facilitate the presence of political parties in indigenous Oaxacan communities. Abigail
Andrews, an Associate Professor of Sociology at University of California, San Diego who spent
several years carrying out field work in various indigenous Oaxacan communities, recounted in
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an interview that for many migrants the experience of living in the United States imbues
westernized attitudes about governance. She suggested that in her experience, westernized
attitudes typically emerge among return migrants as recalcitrance about having to complete
communal labor and being forced to hold leadership positions and pay money to the community.
Importantly, Andrews suggested that the westernization of return migrants’ perceptions of local
governance creates an ideational framework that is propitious for more robust partnership with
political parties. This is best understood in light of her explanations of the disparate
governmental visions of parties and indigenous communities. For instance, she claimed during
our interview that regardless of whether a community elects its local leaders through political
parties or through formal Usos y Costumbres processes, the logic of political parties is
antithetical to the logic of Usos governance. She explains that central to communities influenced
by indigenous philosophy is the understanding that citizenship denotes responsibilities as well as
rights. Alternatively, Andrews claims that parties operate under a “more western logic of how
citizenship operates,” and that both in Usos y Costumbres communities and communities
governed by national elections, parties will seek to operationalize this western citizenship logic
through diminishing communal labor requirements, implementing taxes, and by focusing
governance on maximizing the distribution of funds according to their partisan vision. Put
briefly, Andrews claims that “when parties come in they tend to erode and undermine the spirit
of tradition.” Thus migrants’ administrative post-migration rationale for seeking the municipal
presidency is broadly similar to political parties' vision of government: both govern with an
emphasis on the administration of funds. A perhaps unintended consequence is that return
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migrants’ administrative vision contributes to minimizing the role of nonwestern traditions such
as communal labor and forced leadership.
Paradoxically, my conversation with Cruz-Pérez reveals that transnational migrant
organizations such as FOCOICA, which is a binational organization that advocates for the rights
of indigenous migrants, works with municipal presidents in a way that increases knowledge of
administrative processes. She claimed that FOCOICA will partner with migrants and
non-migrants in sending communities to help them secure 3 x 1 funds from the State and Federal
governments. This is important insofar as we can think of migrant organizations as contributing
to the administrative knowledge which catalyze cultural change in communities of origin.
The story of Ramiro Márquez López’s exceptional municipal presidency further
demonstrates how international migration instills knowledge of administrative processes and the
efficacy to carry them out, which in concert causes return migrants to seek the municipal
presidency. Ramiro holds an important place in the political history of Silacayoapam. After
living in the United States for 16 years, he returned to Silacayoapam and subsequently ran for
municipal president with the PRD. In coordination with the FIOB (an organization of which he
was a State-level coordinator), Ramiro won the municipal presidential election in 2007, thus
ending 28 years of local PRI electoral dominance.
In our two interviews in the Summer and Winter of 2020, Ramiro spoke to the events and
ideas that led him to run for the municipal presidency of Silacayoapam. He claimed that his time
spent in the United States gave him “a lot of ideas” about how he could improve his community
of origin and allowed him to realize the extent to which his community back home was ‘falling
behind’. He also noted at one point during the interview that his compatriots in Silacayoapam
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were ‘wasting their time and energy.’ From these excerpts we can infer that Ramiro’s
international migration experience introduced him to new knowledge of how to improve his
community. Such language is emblematic of Ramiro’s migrant vision.
When Ramiro returned, he was angered how local leaders that were affiliated with the
PRI would intentionally not liaise with State and Federal officials to distribute Ramo 28 and
Ramo 33 funds to Silacayoapam’s 13 constitutive communities, and would instead keep the
funds. Due to the fact that Ramiro has voted for the PRD his whole life, even though PRD
leaders rarely won elections in Oaxaca, we can glean that he had left-leaning partisan
inclinations. Danielson (2018), who interviewed Ramiro in 2010, describes the process by which
he became municipal president as a fundamentally oppositional effort against the hegemonic
PRI. While this is true, Ramiro’s affiliation with the left-leaning PRD, as opposed to the
right-leaning PAN, which was also an opposition party, is notable. This partisan distinction, and
how it interacts with return migrants' sense of administrative knowledge, adds an important
nuance to current work’s classification of migrants as either in opposition to or co-opted by the
hegemonic party. It points to the need to pay more attention to diversity within political
opposition and the agency of return migrant political actors to be oppositional in different ways.
Upon his return, Ramiro launched his campaign for municipal president with a greater
sense of political and administrative efficacy, which he used to carry out the left-leaning goal of
bringing government resources to his community to carry out the vision he saw abroad. During
his campaign, the PRI offered him a bribe to switch partisan affiliations, but he denied the offer
(Danielson 2018). In partnership with the FIOB, he was able to successfully negotiate the release
of Ramo 28, Ramo 33, and 3 x 1 funds the PRI had previously been holding onto and
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subsequently distribute these resources to Silacayoapam’s 13 auxiliary communities. With these
resources he and the FIOB were able to implement significant public infrastructure projects such
as road improvements, increased electrification, and drainage. In a similar vein, Ramiro and the
FIOB jointly implemented informational campaigns and educational workshops to help the
leaders of Silacayoapam’s villages navigate the confusing process of applying for 3 x 1 funds
and administered Spanish lessons to those who only spoke Mixtec, an indigenous language, so as
to facilitate their public participation.
Because it is in the interest of the PRI - or whichever party controls the State and Federal
governments - to keep Ramo 28 and Ramo 33 funds in state coffers, it takes significant
administrative and political knowledge to access these funds. Given the magnitude of the
administrative tasks that fighting for the funds entails, it makes sense that any individuals who
attempt to carry them out would be highly motivated by a vision for change and have significant
trust in their own administrative efficacy. We can think of Ramiro’s international migration
experience and his participation with the FIOB as instilling both of these. That Ramiro carried
out these actions in accordance with the FIOB corroborates’ Cruz-Pérez’s earlier contention that
FOCOICA helped community members to know how to solicit 3 x 1 funding; with both
examples in mind we can conclude that transnational migrant organizations in addition to the
experience of international migration in and of itself help to instill the very complex and often
intentionally withheld administrative knowledge.
Interviews with people in Silacayoapam who have worked with Ramiro in the FIOB or
know him personally echo that his policies have roots in administrative knowledge and efficacy
gained through international migration. Rafael Vera corroborated that the idea of migrant vision
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was a foundational factor of Ramiro’s desire to affect this change: “he came [back to
Silacayoapam] with a more, I’ll say, open vision, which is why he sought to to run… he doesn’t
want to personally benefit from the resources, he wants the authorities to give the money to the
municipalities… There for the first time the municipal president was in charge of getting and
distributing these resources [Ramo 33 and Ramo 28] to the communities. This is a practice that
the PRI did not do when it was the party in power.” We can understand the allusion to “a more
open vision” in this excerpt to refer to the increased administrative knowledge that these changes
require. It is also notable that Rafael specifically suggested that this ‘vision’ was the reason why
he decided to run for municipal president.
Pedro Avillas Salas, a carpenter in Silacayoapam and a founding member of the
community’s chapter of the FIOB who worked with Ramiro while he was in office, echoes the
perception that international migration influenced Ramiro’s redistribution of local funds.
“There is a lot of influence when one migrates. I think that, yes, there was
influence in the case of Ramiro Marquez because when someone from our
community leaves to go to another country, the first thing they see is economic,
cultural, and political development, much more than in our communities. We see
that their government is more faithful in giving information to its communities.
People are much more educated than we are. They see this betterment, and
therefore all of this helps to influence such that we want to make things in our
communities similar. I think that in this way there was influence in the case of
Ramiro’s municipal government. It had an influence in many aspects, including
the management of resources, because it is my understanding that in the US the
management of resources is more transparent… In the case of Ramiro there was
this type of influence, it definitely served his vision for how to try to get things
done in his town.”
Once again, the idea of ‘a changed vision’ is used to allude to the fact that being a migrant in the
United States offers a comparison from which one changes their governing priorities and
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policies. This is specifically salient with regard to the management of resources. Pedro draws a
direct and causal connection between witnessing the United States government’s more
transparent use of resources to Ramiro’s desire to bring a more transparent and equitable
distribution of Oaxacan Ramo 28 funding and federal Mexican Ramo 33 funding to all of the
villages of Silacayoapam. Insofar as the local PRI hegemony’s keeping of municipal resources
was predicated on keeping citizens uninformed, one can also understand Pedro’s recognition of
the United States’ increased transparency as part of the changed vision of good governance.
Pedro’s comment also broaches the theme of education, which is notable because Pedro and
Ramiro were responsible for setting up the previously mentioned information campaigns and
educational programs for those who spoke indigenous languages to increase their civic
engagement and ability to participate politically. It is therefore possible that his inspiration to
carry out more inclusive governance in his community, thereby risking running against an
illiberal local hegemon such as the PRI, was inspired by the model of transparency he witnessed
in the United States.
In our interview, Pedro also how spoke to how return migration affects Silacayoapam’s
development more broadly:
“We speak to people who come back with other religious ideas,
their type of government is very different from that of someone
who has lived here in the community. Because a person leaves,
they come to know many more things about what we in the
community need. What services we lack, which employments can
we promote so that our people have some money. For all of this
they bring a different government, the migrants. The migrant
population returns with a much wider governmental vision of what
development is.”
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By claiming that return migrants “come to know many more things about what we in the
community need,” and additionally using the metaphor of ‘vision,’ Pedro highlights that
international migration experience imbues significant administrative knowledge that is
unavailable to those who have not migrated. As in previous examples where this metaphor was
used, Pedro suggested that by living in a more politically or economically developed society and
therefore having a point of comparison, migrants ascertain a stronger understanding of the ways
in which they could improve their hometown (or, “a much wider governmental vision of what
development is.”) As with the case of Demetrio, Pedro suggests that migrants’ vision for
communal improvement follows the administrative logic wherein those back home are not able
to prosper due to a lack of resources and the administrative capabilities to utilize them. The
following excerpt exemplifies how migrants seek such knowledge in their communities:
Here all of the municipal agents of the community work with
Ramo 28, resources that come from the state, but it is too reduced,
and Ramo 33, a resource which the federal government provides
us. This resource comes and is well used, as the migrants have
more vision as to how to send and use this resource. They have
more vision because they can with less money make a bigger
project because they know this type of resource application. For
this reason even though they do not want to participate in Tequio
nor do they act in traditional ways, they do participate as municipal
agents.

Once again Pedro suggests that international migration causes migrants to have a greater
knowledge of how to administer Ramo 28 and Ramo 33 funds, claiming that “they know this
type of resource application.” It is furthermore notable that he claims “They have more vision
because they can with less money make a bigger project,” because this suggests that beyond an
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increased knowledge, international experience also causes return migrants to have an increased
aptitude for resource administration. Moreover, we can understand that the perspectives and
experiences migrants gain in the United States predispose them to participate in this more
institutional capacity, in this case fund management work as municipal agents. In another
interview, Osiel Nicholas, an ex-migrant who is president of Silacayoapam’s communal goods
committee, explained that these Agentes Municipales (municipal agents) are those who carry out
the community’s resource management principally by liaising with state and federal officials.
Osiel noted that return migrants participate in this role at very high rates throughout Oaxaca.
Thus Pedro, Rafael, and Osiel jointly demonstrate how Ramiro’s municipal presidency
exemplifies a wider phenomenon wherein international migration experience causes return
migrants to possess a ‘vision’ for local government that is linked to a knowledge of local
administrative practices, a almost ideological commitment to technical administration as the best
means for achieving change, and a perception of their personal aptitude in bringing about these
changes.
At one point Pedro pithily said, “migration helps us economically but hurts us culturally.”
He explained that when migrants from Silacayoapam move to the United States, they convert
from Catholicism (Silacayoapam’s predominant religion) to Evangelicalism and imbibe
American cultural norms. When they return with these new cultural experiences, Pedro
described, return migrants do not want to participate in the communal aspects of indigenous
governance, citing a recalcitrance to complete tequio as a prime example. Given the centrality of
such traditions to insular communities like Silacayoapam, such recalcitrance often causes deep
cultural rifts. Insofar as the preceding quotation demonstrates how migrants return to the
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community of origin with a disposition to participate in the administrative affairs of the
community but not the cultural ones such as tequio, we again see the emergence of a pattern
wherein administrative rationales for seeking municipal office supplant the communal and
traditional indigenous local political culture.
The final interview through which I illustrate my point is with Bernardo Ramirez
Bautista, a man from Silacayoapam who served as a State coordinator for the FIOB in Oaxaca.
Bernardo echoed the idea that return migrants are drawn to run for president by administrative
knowledge and efficacy. Moreover, he claims that this tendency can sometimes adversely affect
the community by increasing party entrenchment. In our interview he suggested that the political
context of the United States is very different from that of Mexico, and for this reason they
“completely unlearn the political and social context of their municipalities.” By this, he appears
to refer to the local political knowledge required to carry out complex infrastructure projects as
well as a familiarity and comfort with the Usos y Costumbres-style traditions. Bernardo explains
that in the cases where these return migrants win the municipal presidency, their previous
immersion in the political context of the United States causes their vision for development to
consist primarily as investment in infrastructure works in their communities, but their unlearning
of the Mexican political systems impedes their ability to access and administer various funds that
are required for such development. Bernardo’s claim contrasts directly with the argument I have
developed above. He suggests instead that migrants lose the administrative knowledge required
to run the municipio well. I now turn to explain what might explain this inconsistency.
Bernardo noted that in Oaxaca, parties, specifically the PRI, have traditionally sought to
co-opt migrants because parties want to use migrant remittances for development projects to
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facilitate clientelism and patronage politics, which benefit candidates and parties as opposed to
citizens. Bernardo specified that parties are interested in return migrant presidents not for their
personal wealth but for the access to municipal funds held by state and federal governments. His
comments merit further inquiry, particularly as they align with research by Waddell (2015) and
Meseguer and Aparicio (2012). Nevertheless, his statements suggest that leaders of the party in
power at the state level are aware that return migrants who seek the municipal presidency bring
administrative vision, knowledge and efficacy, which can, in turn, undermine the party’s control
over public funds. Bernardo thus intimates that it is precisely these aspects of return migrant
political actors that motivate parties to recruit them as candidates.

Return Migrant Developmental and Administrative Vision, Discussion and Conclusions
Analysis of interviews carried out in San Pablo Huixtepec and Silacayoapam thus
collectively allow us to draw out the specific rationales as to why return migrants run for the
position of municipal president. Namely, I find that when international migrants come to see
their community of origin’s relative lack of political and economic development, they gain a
‘vision’ of how to develop their hometowns. This vision has the goal of economically
modernizing their hometowns, and it entails familiarity with more robust forms of administration
as well as a perception of their personal efficacy to manifest change in their communities. I
conclude that these factors cause return migrants to seek the administratively-centered post of
municipal president.
The political context of decentralization emerged as a central factor to understanding why
return migrants seek the municipal presidency. As Leonel explained, decentralization augmented
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the role of local government in securing State and National development funds, in turn
increasing the administrative responsibilities and political stakes of the municipal presidency.
This causes return migrants to seek the municipal presidency as they perceive the heightened
funding power of the role as facilitating their administrative vision for improving local
government.
The interview analysis presented in this section suggests that return migrants who
participate in the politics of their community of origin often seek to diminish the importance of
Usos y Costumbres customs such as tequio, as well as its traditional notion of prestige as earned
through unremunerated labor. I find that the change is due to the fact that the community
service-based understandings of local government are antithetical to return migrants’ vision of
economic modernization and the administrative logic through which such modernization is
carried out that I claim motivates return migrants to seek the municipal presidency.
The recurrence of administrative knowledge and efficacy suggests that they are germane
frameworks for conceptualizing the motivations and effects of return migrant participation. From
this point of consistency in the data, however, I posit that the ways in which administrative
efficacy and knowledge influences a return migrant’s specific political vision and subsequent
political actions can vary significantly based on their lives prior to international migration. I
conclude that pre-migration political socialization is one such axis of variation to consider.
Return migrants with leftist pre-migration political predispositions can result in political
partnerships that result in a vision of municipal development that is redistributive and rooted in
partnership with government. Conversely, this migration-induced administrative efficacy for
return migrants with right-wing pre-migration political socializations and/or partisan affiliations
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may lead to administrative works in a capitalist vision or through public-private partnerships. In
light of this framework, let us consider the cases of Demetrio and Ramiro, both of whose
motivations were rooted in administrative vision but conceived through distinct political lenses.
Demetrio had been a lifelong militant of the PAN, a right-wing party most analogous to
the United States’ Republican party due to its emphasis on free market capitalism and job
creation. In our interview he spoke about how he had been a militant for the PAN for his entire
life. Interview analysis clearly demonstrates that his experience abroad instilled personal
administrative efficacy and subsequently caused these free market predispositions to be
manifested into an administrative governing agenda of job creation and public-private
partnerships. This happened most notably through his claims that he wanted to do a better job of
administering 3 x 1 funds in his community. It bears mentioning here that while 3 x 1 is a
government program, it emphasizes entrepreneurship and public-private partnerships much more
than the similar Ramo 28 and Ramo 33 programs. Indeed, the fact that Demetrio did not talk
about Ramo 28 and Ramo 33 in his vision to bring more robust administration to San Pablo
Huixtepec can also be interpreted as speaking to his political ideology.
Ramiro’s pre-migration political socialization is also salient with regard to what would
become his historic governing agenda. As mentioned earlier, we can assume from Ramiro’s
history of voting for the PRD that Ramiro’s understanding of how to improve his community
would be rooted in lefitst ideals such as redistribution. It is thus not surprising that the
administrative knowledge and efficacy which Ramiro gleaned from international migration
experience as well as his partnership with the FIOB were manifested in more equitable
administration of Ramo 28 and Ramo 33 funds to Silacayoapam’s auxiliary communities.
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Both programs require significant administrative knowledge to understand given their
complex nature, and both require administrative efficacy to carry out given how parties are
recalcitrant to relinquish the funds. The difference between Ramiro’s use of Ramo 28 and Ramo
33 funds and Demetrio’s opting for 3 x 1 is relevant in that it aligns with their political
ideologies.
The relationship is less clear-cut when either the administrative activities carried out or
the municipal president’s partisan affiliation do not reflect such strong ideological predilections.
For instance, Alejandro Cruz served as municipal president of San Pablo Huixtepec for the more
ideologically moderate PRI. Due to the fact that running with the PRI does not invoke a distinct
ideological method such as the PAN being implementing free-market politics or the PRD being
redistributive, it is more difficult to ascertain to what extent the administrative efficacy that
Alejandro’s manifested while municipal president interacts with his pre-migration socialization.
It is also more difficult for someone like Antonio Villa who did run with Mexico’s left-wing
MORENA but whose government priority of diminishing the cargo system does not reflect as
salient an ideological leaning as that of his party. With these limitations in mind, I find there to
be a suggestive, but not conclusive, relationship between political affiliation and return migrant
administrative efficacy.
The preceding paragraphs allow for consideration of other, non-partisan and
non-ideological aspects of pre-migration socialization on the formation of migrant vision.
Alejandro was a teacher for many years and participated actively in section 22 of Oaxaca’s
teacher’s union Coordinadora Nacional de Trabajadoras de la Educación (National Coordinator
of Education Workers - CNTE), from which we can reasonably assume that improving the
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educational system in San Pablo was important to Alejandro. We see this preference reflected in
how he manifested his migrant vision while mayor for the PRI. He claimed that he was inspired
to see how much better funded and implemented the schools were in the United States, and as a
result he worked to improve the gardens and cafeteria at the local schools. While this
relationship is somewhat intuitive, it is yet to be fully explored. In other words, it is worth
considering how Sergio Wals’ concept of the ‘political suitcase’ of pre-migration political
socialization could be expanded to provide a theoretical framework for the impact of different
variations of pre-migration socialization on their governance as return migrant municipal
presidents.
As evidenced in the literature review, the relationship between return migrant political
actors and hegemonic parties is conceptualized by extant scholarship as frequently involving
co-optation of migrants (i.e., integrating migrants into the hegemonic party to quell their dissent
without taking into account their needs), or alternatively, resistance to co-optation that results in
political opposition. I encountered a reference to this co-optation in the interviews that fall into
this framework. Namely, Bernardo pointed out that the PRI attempts to take advantage of return
migrants’ administrative approaches to government by working with them to construct
development projects that favor their political interests. I was surprised to see that co-optation as
the literature characterizes was not reported among return migrant municipal presidents and
return migrant municipal presidential candidates whom I interviewed.
All the same, I posit a slight nuance to the scholarship’s characterization of return
migrant political actor’s resisting co-optation. While the description of resisting co-optation
given in the preceding paragraph does technically apply to the case of Ramiro (he rejected a
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bribe to join the PRI and ran his campaign against the party), I suggest that it lacks subtle
nuances. Ramiro could have allied himself with either of the community’s opposition forces, the
PRD or the PAN. I suggest that the fact that Ramiro chose to run for the municipal president with
the party that aligns with his left-leaning ideological preferences signifies that he had agency
over the process by which he opposed the PRI. This is important because it signifies that
characterizing the rationale for Ramiro’s municipal candidacy as exclusively to unseat the PRI is
incomplete. Instead, Ramiro’s ideologically-aligned party preference suggests that he
additionally considered the partnership as a way through which he could implement his own
constructive vision of local politics that emerged from and was catalyzed by international
migration and transnational migrant organizations.
Given the structure of municipal funding and the political relationships between state and
local governments that resulted from decentralization, it is conceivable that all candidates, not
only return migrant candidates, require administrative knowledge and vision to run for office.
While this argument is compelling, the effect of migration appears to be particularly salient, if
not unique, in fostering administrative vision. Firstly, return migrants consistently explained that
their desire to bring an administrative vision to their community of origin through the position of
municipal presidency arose as a specific and direct consequence of their experience as a migrant.
Furthermore, numerous interviews carried out with Oaxacan academics and members of San
Pablo Huixtepec and Silacayoapam who are not municipal presidents or migrants but are
nonetheless knowledgeable about their community’s electoral affairs pointed to a specific link
between attitudinal changes gained through international migration and the desire to institute
administrative change in their communities. For instance, analysis of conversations with Pedro
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and Bernardo make unequivocal the contention that Ramiro’s administrative government was
related to his time as a migrant.
Still, further research is needed to better understand precisely which migration
experiences, either in the US or involving collaborations with NGOs, like the FIOB, produce this
vision and how they interact with pre- and post-migration political socialization. Moreover, a full
account of the role of migration in shaping administrative vision would involve a comparison of
return migrant versus non-migrant mayoral candidates.
Given the limited nature of my research sample, these findings should be circumscribed
in other ways too. Due to the nature of the snowball sampling method I used, many of my
interviews in each community were with people of similar ideological backgrounds who were
part of the same social and political circles within the community. For instance, Ramiro,
Bernardo, Rafael, and Pedro have all worked with or are strong supporters of the left-wing FIOB,
and half actually worked with Ramiro in his administration. It is possible that someone who did
not know Ramiro or was not a fan of his politics might characterize his municipal presidency
differently. These four interviews also represent a smaller sample size of interviewees than I
employed in San Pablo Huixtepec, and out of these four only Ramiro has had migration
experience. I similarly find that my argument about how partisan logic and political ideology
influence developmental vision and administrative capacity would benefit from more evidence.
In order to corroborate this finding, I would need to carry out interviews with more candidates
from opposition parties (i.e. not the PRI) on both the ideological left (e.g. MORENA, PRD) and
right (e.g. PAN).
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7. Conclusion
My principal purposes were to uncover how and why return migrants run for the
municipal presidency, why political parties seek to create partnerships with return migrants, and
what the effects of these partnerships are on Oaxaca’s indigenous local political context. My
thesis has established that attitudinal shifts which emerge during international migration as well
as reputational increases which result therefrom facilitate relationships between return migrants
and political parties which create distinctly administrative governing agendas.
I first set out to understand why parties seek return migrants as municipal presidential
candidates despite their having transgressed against the fundamental privilege given to
intra-community unremunerated service. Interviewees collectively outlined the notion of migrant
prestige - the reputational increase that arises from international migration - and suggested that
parties perceive association with return migrant prestige to be a way to increase their odds of
electoral success. In the interviews, return migrant prestige arose from a wide variety of
communal perceptions: that returning to the community after having migrated is prestigious in
and of itself; that return migrants are part of important migrant social networks abroad; that they
contribute to the community’s customary life and infrastructure.
I then proceeded to study why return migrants seek the municipal presidency. I found that
among those I interviewed, the experience of international migration interacted with
pre-migration socialization to instill a knowledge of new forms of administration as well as a
perception of personal administrative efficacy to institute these new administrative knowledges,
which concertedly caused migrants to seek the municipal presidency. I additionally found that
Mexican political decentralization increased the extent to which administrative vision can be
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carried out through the municipal presidency, thereby catalyzing the administration-focused
reasons I posit why return migrants seek the municipal presidency. I found that this
administrative vision of governance aligns to some extent with political parties’ approaches to
development and, relatedly, can lead return migrants to seek to diminish the dominance of
traditional norms.
These findings contribute to the underdeveloped scholarship on return migrant political
participation in several ways. My finding that parties seek electoral advantage through
association with return migrants’ bolstered reputations suggest that the literature may benefit
from considering parties’ interests in return migrants beyond co-optation of financial
remittances. By finding that new administrative knowledge and attitudes gained abroad may be a
primary reason why return migrants seek the municipal presidency, I suggest that return migrants
are significant but understudied carriers of social remittances in and of themselves. Furthermore,
by contextualizing return migrants’ political and administrative visions in their specific
pre-migration political socialization, I suggest that the literature on return migrant attitudes
would benefit from a more rigorous study of the lives of migrants prior to emigration. I also add
nuance to the current literature’s characterization of return migrant political actors opposing
entrenched local parties by showing how return migrants exhibit agency and party choice.
Relatedly, I suggest that return migrants running for municipal president against a local
hegemonic party should not only be studied on the merits of its oppositional nature; and rather
that it can additionally be a way in which return migrants carry out their own administrative
vision.
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Despite these significant contributions, my research has limitations that open up
questions for future research. For instance, the scope of my analysis on return migration is
limited to the Oaxacan indigenous experience. Further research might explore a similar set of
questions in any of Mexico’s States where local politics is rooted in a specific traditional context.
If this project were not limited to one academic year, I would continue this research by
completing interviews in communities that are formally governed by Usos y Costumbres. Such
comparative case studies might illuminate if and how the relationship between return migrants
and political parties may change as a result of parties’ purported absence from the electoral
process. If I had more time to continue this study I would attempt to conduct interviews with
party leaders in Mexico at the State level, as having these perspectives would allow me to bring
significant nuance to the narratives of co-optation I present, and additionally could make more
precise my attempt to disaggregate the multiple reasons for which parties might seek partnership
with return migrants. Further research might carry out a comparative study between
non-migrants and migrants to verify my thesis’ claims that international migration has significant
effects on traditional local governance and return migrant relationships to parties.
I conclude by briefly touching on the implications of the connections between my thesis’
two fundamental ideas of return migrant prestige and return migrant administrative vision. One
area of commonality between the two is “the ability to get things done.” I found this to be
essential to communities of origin’s positive perception of return migrants (i.e. prestige) as well
as a central aspect of why return migrants seek the municipal presidency (i.e. administrative
vision). I find this combination to be essential to entrenched political parties, but for different
reasons. Insofar as return migrant prestige facilitates migrants occupying positions of local
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power and, additionally, that return migrant administrative vision may impact a candidate's
political courage and ability to use local power in ways that create significant change, we can
understand that political parties stand to gain immensely from alliances with return migrant
actors. I suggest that candidates and parties’ different rationales concerning return migrant
prestige and vision are thus a useful framework for future studies of the relationship between
migrant local political actors and entrenched political parties.
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